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2Dear readers!
The next – jubilee! – 25th issue of the analytical bulletin "IISEPS News" offers to your attention
materials reflecting the most interesting results of the Institute’s work in the third quarter of 2002.
V. Putin’s statements about further development of the Russia-Belarus integration became the
most significant event, which agitated public-political life within this period. In this respect, political
prospects of A. Lukashenko, the opposition and the country as a whole reshaped. The reaction by
the Belarus president (reinforced with the might of the entire state information-propagandistic ma-
chine), who instantly turned into an advocate of state sovereignty and national pride of Belarusians,
provoked numerous questions and doubts, hopes and blunt speculations, both in Belarus and
abroad. Is A. Lukashenko in fact likely to follow the path of "national salvation", consolidation of Be-
larus’ society, rapprochement with the West or to continue (begin another) integration game? The
choice of the right strategy for the Belarusian opposition, Russia’s leadership and the West depends
on the right answer to these questions. Thus, the given bulletin is mostly devoted to the integration
issue.
The issue of integration, however, "raises" another closely related topic – a drop in
A. Lukashenko’s popularity rating, a further divergence of public and authorities in Belarus. As a
matter of fact, that was the key reason for a sudden turn in Russia-Belarus relations (as
G. Pavlovsky, the President of the Efficient Policy Foundation and an aide to the Russian president,
tactfully noted, "that’s the reason why Russia had to specify the balance of its relations with Be-
larus"). The statements by the Belarus president made on NTV television on September 9 (which in
fact became an open challenge to V. Putin), as well as during the September 17 press conference in
Minsk (about a possible referendum on introducing changes to the Constitution allowing him to be
elected the president for the third term), clearly say that the integration is not so much an issue of
foreign, as of home policy process.
The results of the latest IISEPS national public opinion poll, presented in the given issue as fig-
ures, tables, trends as well as analytical materials, make evident not only the president’s still falling
rating (about 1% a month), but also an absolutely different public attitude towards the integration
with Russia (including the variants suggested by V. Putin), than declared by the head of state.
Hence, in particular, one could suppose that under such course of events not just reelection, but
retention of his powers until the next presidential election might become a real problem for
A. xdddaLukashenko. In a word, there is enough pabulum for reflection of analysts, journalists, poli-
ticians, diplomats and all those interested in public-political life in Belarus.
Nonetheless, no matter what facts and events are recorded by IISEPS’s studies, they could be
viewed in different ways. In order to keep objective information not "overshadowed" by analysis
(which, if you please, can be claimed "engaged", "ordered", etc.), we introduced the rubric "Open Fo-
rum". Our readers have had the opportunity to familiarize with different points of view of leading Be-
larusian politicians, experts and diplomats, which often do not coincide with our opinions. This time,
since the integration is the key subject of the bulletin, "Open Forum" is given to prominent Russian
expert (head of the Belarus Department at the NIS Institute) Professor Alexander Fadeyev. We think
his analysis would be of great interest to our readers.
The Appendix contains another Regulation of the Belarusian Council of Ministers (#1174 dated
August 29, 2002) which shifts the process of establishing control of state authorities over independ-
ent social studies to a "working" stage: it defines the place of the control mechanism in the system of
state authorities, the terms of its "switching on" and those responsible for its realization. We believe
that these minor, in terms of global problems (falling life standards, the country’s isolation, the threat
of losing sovereignty, etc.) decisions by Belarus’ authorities could in fact cause almost the same
damage to our society and the sate as social conflicts or natural upheavals, because they take con-
trol not of sociology and mass media, but public opinion.
We hope that the jubilee issue of our bulletin would be interesting and helpful to you and your
colleagues. We are awaiting your comments and requests!
IISEPS Board
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In September 2002 in the framework of the project "Strengthening Role of Independent Social
Research and Experts’ Network in Belarus" IISEPS conducted a nation public opinion poll (those
face-to-face interviewed – 1509 persons aged 18 and over, margin of error does not exceed 0.03).
The questionnaire covered a wide range of problems related to the most pressing and most topical
aspects of life in Belarus.
Below you will find commentaries to the most important findings of the poll made by IISEPS ex-
perts. "No answer" and "Find it difficult to answer" alternatives are excluded from some tables. In
several tables the total amount may be different from 100% as the interviewees could choose more
than one alternative. Certain findings of the poll were traditionally represented with regard to the ba-
sic social-demographic groups and without commentaries. As before, we traditionally present the
major trends of the public opinion’s basic social parameters.
Collapse. A. Lukashenko’s rating continues to fall
This past spring IISEPS recorded a slump in A. Lukashenko’s popularity rating – from 46% in Octo-
ber to 30.9% in April. Such a "collapse" (as the president would say) caused various processes both
in domestic and foreign political markets – from public dismissal of members of the Belarusian gov-
ernment to fundamental changes in Russia-Belarus relations. We shall remind that right after
V. Putin’s statement on June 14 about the necessity to "separate flies from cutlets" the President of
the Efficient Policy Foundation G. Pavlovsky said literally the following: "With respect to the Union
there is such a notion "political correctness", because we all know that the rating of the Belarus
president is falling. That is neither good, nor bad. That is the fact. That is the key reason why Russia
had to specify the balance of its relations with Belarus". The reaction by the Belarus president, who
instantly turned into an advocate of state sovereignty and national pride of Belarusians, provoked
numerous questions and doubts, hopes and blunt speculations, both in Belarus and abroad. Many
expected a "new course" to expand A. Lukashenko’s electoral base and his authority to rise. And
what about today’s attitude of the Belarusian electorate towards the president?
As one could see from Table 1, the president (and therefore his policy) does not enjoy support of
the majority. Moreover, within four months his rating dropped 4% (in Minsk it went down from 27.5%
to 22.4%). Today most Belarusians say they are not satisfied with A. Lukashenko’s ruling (See Ta-
ble 2).
Table 1
Electorate’s attitude towards A. Lukashenko
Indexes of attitude towards A. Lukashenko %
Would have voted for A. Lukashenko at a new presidential election* 27.0
Would have voted for A. Lukashenko at an election of Russia-Belarus president * 15.0
Trust the President 36.1
Consider A. Lukashenko an ideal politician 23.2
* Answer to an open question (i.e. the respondents wrote down politician’s name)
Table  2
Distribution of answers to the question "Are you satisfied with A. Luka-
shenko’s ruling?"
Variant of answer %
Rather satisfied 12.9
Partially satisfied 26.2
Partially dissatisfied 20.7
Rather dissatisfied 36.5
4Estimation of his activity, which was growing during the first term of his presidency, is falling again
(See Table 3).
Table 3
Dynamics of estimation of the Belarus president’s work
(on 5-grade scale)
Time of questioning 1 2 3 4 5 Average grade
11'94 20.8 19.7 34.9 17.0 6.4 2.65
09'00 13.8 13.4 33.2 24.2 14.3 3.09
09'02 17.6 20.5 30.7 21.1 8.3 2.82
After the September 17 press conference of the president many in Belarus and abroad ask them-
selves the question: what are A. Lukashenko’s chances to be reelected for the third term, which, as
the president put it, is possible "only if we have a proper Constitutional norm. And that article of the
Constitution falls under referendum. That means only by means of a referendum?" And we asked
Belarusians about it (See Table 4).
Table 4
Distribution of answers to the question "If there were a referendum on changing the Constitution of
Belarus to make A. Lukashenko eligible for the third term of presidency, how would you vote?"
Variant of answer %
Would vote for such changes 15.5
Would vote against such changes 50.6
Do not know at the moment, would judge by circumstances 25.4
Would not take part in the referendum 7.2
NA 1.3
A deeper analysis shows that considering presumable reaction of the undetermined (according to
a long-term monitoring of electoral behavior, the majority of those undetermined joins a dominant
determined group at polling stations), if such a referendum were to take place tomorrow, from 52%
to 60% of Belarusians would have probably voted against such amendments to the Constitution.
During the last year the public’s negative reaction to this idea increased (See Table 5).
Which factors determine the choice of voters: to vote at a hypothetical referendum for the possi-
bility of reelecting A. Lukashenko or against it?
Table 5
Dynamics of attitude towards the Constitutional norm banning A. Lukashenko from being elected for
the third consecutive term, %
Variant of answer 10'01 09'02
Positive. I think the restriction should be lifted 23.4 23.7
Negative. I think the restriction should be kept 52.7 58.0
DA/NA 23.9 18.3
A comparative analysis of these antagonistic groups of Belarus’ electorate on social-demographic
profile revealed almost no critical differences (by which different attitudes towards reelecting
A. Lukashenko could be explained) between them. As we assumed, there are more women among
those ready to vote for such amendments to the Constitution, than men, people with low education
level, aged people, pensioners, Orthodox believers, residents of towns and villages having low in-
comes. On the contrary, among those who are ready to vote against such amendments to the Con-
stitution there are more people with a higher level of education, youth, students and those working in
the private economy sector, Protestants, residents of the capital and regional centers having higher
incomes. If we do not take into account expected differences among pensioners (dominated by
those ready to vote for) and students (dominated by those ready to vote against) critical differences
are revealed only among the respondents with the lowest and highest levels of education.
5The language factor showed itself in a special way. 29.1% of those respondents who speak the
Belarusian language in everyday life are ready to support changing the Constitution, with 41.2%
against; among those who speak the mixed "trasyanka" the ratio is 18.4% to 45.8%; among those
who speak both languages – 15.9% to 46.2%; and among those who speak Russian – 11.6% to
57.0%! That is a further evidence of the conclusion, which we drew several years ago: in Belarus the
spoken language became not so much a cultural, as demographic factor.
Material-economic factors have a stronger influence on the choice of Belarusians than social-
demographic factors. For example, 21.8% of those who say their life has improved since 1994 are
ready to support changing the Constitution, whereas 47.7% are against; while among those who an-
swer in the opposite the ratio is 10.4% to 59.5%. Among those who have faced no backpays in
wages or pensions during the last year 22.4% are ready to vote for changing the Constitution, while
among those who face the problem almost monthly the figure is 9.1%.
Among the respondents with incomes per family member in August below 85,000 rubles the ratio
is 19.6% to 43.2%; among the respondents with incomes above 140,000 rubles – 4.8% to 67.5%.
Another important factor was Belarusians’ attitude towards observance of law (or "justice" as
people would say). So, among those who believe that "during A. Lukashenko’s ruling powers and
arbitrariness of state officials have decreased" the given ratio is 29.8% to 39.2%, and among those
who think "powers and arbitrariness have increased" – 7.1% to 67.9%. Among those who believe
that "all are equal before the law in our country, and a perpetrator will account for it" the ratio is
34.9% to 33.3%, and among those who think that "those who hold high posts could avoid punish-
ment for committed crimes" – 10.7% to 61.4%! From this point of view the recent raid against non-
state press in the form of court trials against Pagonya, Nasha Svaboda, Narodnaya Volya, Rabochy,
caused a reverse effect. If among those who believe that "they were treated fairly" (because "they
published false information about authorities’ activity"), the given ratio is 33.7% to 36.4%, among
those who consider it unfair – it is 7.0% to 74.2%! That is what explains the lowest rating of law en-
forcement agencies among all other state institutions: today 26.5% of Belarusians trust courts
(49.6% distrust), 22.2% trust police (57.3% distrust)!
However, the most significant factor determining Belarusians’ attitude to the third presidential
term of A. Lukashenko by means of changing the Constitution was their awareness of …the presi-
dent’s real rating and his possible rival! Among those who believe that "during the 2001 presidential
election A. Lukashenko’s rating (i.e. the population’s readiness to vote for him at the next presiden-
tial election) rose" 51.1% are ready to support such amendments to the Constitution (14.0% –
against), and among those who think it dropped – only 4.7% (71.7% – against). If we consider these
groups from "a different side", the picture is even more impressive. So, among the respondents
ready to vote for the third term 56.6% believe that during the past year the president’s rating rose,
and only 18.1% – dropped. But among those against changing the Constitution the ratio is 4.7% to
84.6%!!! Among those who "do not know a candidate able to compete with A. Lukashenko at a
presidential election" 46.2% are ready to vote against changing the Constitution, and 77.9% among
those who know such a candidate.
On the basis of the above facts one could suppose with a high degree of probability that if the
absolute majority of Belarusians knew about A. Lukashenko’s falling rating and imagined his possi-
ble rival, there would have been no chances of introducing such amendments to the Constitution.
(We shall note that such proposal does not take into account the factor of political control allowing
authorities to demonstrate necessary results at any election). In this context the maniacal desire of
Belarusian authorities to put independent public opinion research centers and independent press
making public findings of such centers under control seems quite explicable. So, among those who
believe that "the authorities shall control study and formation of public opinion" 39.2% are ready to
vote for changing the Constitution (29.6% – against), and among those who think that "study and
formation of public opinion shall be free" the given ratio is 7.3% to 67.0%! The authorities, as we
see, are ready even to infringe upon public sense of justice for the sake of retaining information
control, and finally, the power.
What is the prognosis? We shall take the risk of assuming that if influence of material-economic
(deteriorating living standards), legal (law violation) and, especially, information factors (for example,
6objective information about the state of affairs in the country via Russia’s TV channels) is not pulled
up, the Belarus president’s rating is likely to continue its downtrend. Based on the pace of its recent
"easy" falling – approximately 1% a month (not taking into account the collapse during the first six
months after the election) – we shall expect it to drop to 15% in a year, which is usually considered a
critical threshold for a head of state. Under such course of events not so mush reelection for the
third term, as retention of his powers until the next presidential election could become a real problem
for A. Lukashenko.
Attitude of Belarusians towards the integration with Russia
Based on the results of IISEPS studies, with a high degree of probability we could assume that re-
gardless of numerous statements, A. Lukashenko and his team are unable to carry out the "new
course" (including Minsk’s unexpected readiness to receive even the Pope!), being actively pro-
moted by the entire state propagandistic machine. First of all because the president has no electoral
resources for that purpose. All the eight years of his presidency he has constantly exploited the im-
age of the "gatherer of Slavic land", Orthodox "adherent" and the last "bulwark on the way of west-
ern expansion". As a result of such politics the political subjects and electoral groups which stood up
for independence, democracy, denomination diversity and the European path of development were
marginalized, driven into the periphery of the social-political process. That means at the moment the
authorities have no electoral resources to rely on.
Although Belarus’ authorities (in the person of A. Lukashenko, L. Kozik, L. Yermoshina, etc.)
claim today that there is no point (it is impossible, illegal, etc.) in organizing in Belarus a referendum
on V. Putin’s proposals, many still wonder: but what if such referendum takes place? Of course, a lot
will depend on the position of Belarusian authorities. The 1999 local election, the 2000 parliamentary
election and the presidential election of 2001 showed that the authorities possess a powerful factor
of political control. That means if they are really interested in "the national approval of the course for
independence", the necessary results would be demonstrated. If we disengage from the factor of
political control and consider public opinion, it is not like that presented by the authorities (See Ta-
ble 6).
A deeper analysis shows that considering presumable reaction of the undetermined (according to
a long-term monitoring of electoral behavior, the majority of those undetermined joins a dominant
determined group at polling stations), if such a referendum were to take place tomorrow, at least
50% of Belarusians would probably support the proposal of the Russian president.
Table 6
Distribution of answers to the question "Russia’s president suggested to hold in spring 2003 a refer-
endum on the following question: "Do you agree with Russia and Belarus uniting into a single state
on the following principles:
/ ensuring parity of rights and freedoms of citizens of the united state;
b/ parity of the regions of the Russian Federation and Belarus as subjects of the common state;
c/ establishment of common governing bodies in line with the Russian Constitution?"
If there were such a referendum, how would you vote?", %
Variant of answer All
respondents
A. Lukashenko’s
supporters*
A. Lukashenko’s op-
ponents*
I would say I agree 32.3 41.7 27.0
I would say I disagree 26.3 22.4 37.2
Do not know at the moment, would judge by circum-
stances
31.7 29.5 28.5
Would not take part in the referendum 8.0 6.4 7.2
* Convinced supporters are those who are ready to vote for A. Lukashenko at the Belarus presidential election and the presidential election
of the Russia-Belarus Union, who trust him and consider him an ideal politician. Convinced opponents are those who distrust the president
and choose another politician on all other issues.
A comparative analysis of those who agree and disagree with V. Putin’s proposal on social-
7demographic profile revealed almost no critical differences (by which different attitudes towards the
integration could be explained) between these groups of the Belarusian society. As we assumed,
there are more women among those who agree, than men, people with low education level, aged
people, pensioners, residents of towns and villages having low incomes. On the contrary, among
those who disagree there are more people with a higher level of education, youth, students, resi-
dents of the capital and regional centers having higher incomes. If we do not take into account ex-
pected differences among pensioners (dominated by those who agree) and students (dominated by
those who disagree), critical differences are revealed only among representatives of different relig-
ions (those who agree dominate among Orthodox believers, those who disagree – among Catholics,
and especially Protestants) and respondents with different national identification. The respondents
who believe that Belarusians do not differ from Russians are dominated by those who agree, while
those who disagree more often see differences in language, culture, psychology and history. The
same analysis of those who refuse to take part in the referendum or have not made their choice yet
revealed no significant differences on these criteria – the social-demographic profile of these groups
coincides with the profile of the entire representation.
The respondents’ attitude towards President A. Lukashenko and his policy is a more important
characteristic of Belarusians’ attitude towards the integration with Russia. As we see from Table 6,
A. Lukashenko’s convinced supporters dominate those who agree with V. Putin’s offer, among those
who disagree – his opponents. Unlike three years ago, the given distribution is not mirror-like. That
means that negative attitude towards A. Lukashenko is in no strict correlation to negative attitude
towards the integration. We have repeatedly written that the most important factor of this funda-
mental shift in Belarusians’ mass consciousness is V. Putin and his policy (especially since the be-
ginning of Russia’s active rapprochement with the West), which are viewed as a real and acceptable
alternative to A. Lukashenko and his policy. Thus, with a high degree of probability we could assume
that if Russia’s leadership openly and clearly gives Belarusians to understand that the policy of
A. Lukashenko does not suit it any longer, positive feelings towards Russia are likely to grow even
more in Belarus.
Table 7
Distribution of answers to the question "If as a result of the referendum Belarus becomes a part of
the Russian Federation, how most probably would you act?" (answers of those who chose options
"agree" and "would not take part" to the previous question), %
Variant of answer All
respondents
A. Lukashenko’s
supporters
A. Lukashenko’s
opponents
I would accept it, because the results of the referendum could not
be changed 29.5 25.4 30.3
I would take part in mass protest actions (rallies, demonstrations,
strikes) to try to change the results 7.9 2.1 13.8
I would move to a different country 2.4 0 4.9
I would be ready to stand up for Belarus’ independence with arms 2.1 0.4 2.9
DA 11.2 12.9 10.2
Therefore, national-democratic forces shall not flatter themselves that the dominant group of
A. Lukashenko’s convinced opponents would have voted against the proposal of V. Putin. The
hopes that those who disagree with such results of the referendum, guided by the national idea or
appeals by the president, will come out in the streets, thereby "standing up to protect the Father-
land", are rather doubtful (See Table 7).
Today the majority of Belarusians is ready to take part in the Union State parliamentary election,
which, according to V. Putin’s proposal, could be carried out in autumn of 2003 (See Table 8).
Strengthening Belarus’ independence, in our opinion, has nothing in common with a false and
provoking dilemma formulated by some ideologists of the national-democratic movement five years
ago (and currently upheld by many opponents of both national and democratic idea) – "dictatorship
in independent Belarus is better, that democracy within Russia". Clearly, in real time and place (i.e.
with the present start positions) Belarus could hardly return to Europe, "escaping" from Russia, as
countries of the Central and Eastern Europe did (and still do). Neither the majority of Belarusians,
8nor Russia itself would support such aspirations. That, however, does not necessarily mean that the
future of Belarusian is only within Russia. Such variant seems acceptable (for different, sometimes
diametrically opposite reasons) neither for many Belarusians, nor for many Russians. A real variant
– which suits the majority of Belarusians and Russians, and the international community – is return-
ing to Europe together with Russia by means of strengthening democracy, market economy, law-
abiding state in both countries, good neighborly relations and coordinated actions on the interna-
tional arena. And under President V. Putin, especially after his public statements about the future of
the Russia-Belarus integration, this variant becomes not simply "more acceptable", but quite real.
First of all, because there is – for the first time! – a serious electoral resource for that purpose. (See
Table 9).
Table 8
Distribution of answers to the question "If there were an election to the Union Parliament, would you
take part in it?"
Variant of answer All respondents A. Lukashenko’s support-
ers
A. Lukashenko’s opponents
Yes 60.9 68.0 58.3
No 17.3 7.5 24.4
DA 21.8 24.5 17.3
Table 9
Distribution of answers to the question "V. Putin has recently harshly criticized the approaches of
the Belarusian leadership to the integration of Belarus and Russia, and during the latest meeting
with A. Lukashenko in the Kremlin he has offered to choose from two variants: to unite on the prin-
ciples of the European Union (each state remains independent, and relies on itself), or Belarus shall
become a part of the Russian Federation (and receive assistance on equal rights with other Russia’s
regions).Which of these variants do you support?", %
Variant of answer All
respondents
A. Lukashenko’s
supporters
A. Lukashenko’s
opponents
Integration of the principles of the European Union 48.5 28.6 64.5
Integration by means of Belarus becoming part of Russia 21.9 28.6 17.7
DA 29.6 41.8 17.8
Since "the integration on the EU principles" seems not quite clear to many Belarusians and Rus-
sians, (how two countries could efficiently cooperate on such principles, if they are unequal in their
resources, character of public-political and social-economic system? Why creating another Union on
the border with the existing European Union Russia tries to join?), aspirations of the majority of Be-
larusians to enter Europe could be used for the integration in line with this variant (See Table 10).
Table 10
Distribution of answers to the question "If tomorrow there were a referendum on Belarus’ accession
ot the European Union, how would you vote?", %
Variant of answer All respondents A. Lukashenko’s supporters A. Lukashenko’s opponents
For 53.4 28.0 69.6
Against 8.1 21.5 3.9
Would not vote 13.0 17.2 8.9
DA 25.5 33.2 17.6
We could assume that in case an alternative to A. Lukashenko is found and realized, if a centrist,
who will not trade in sovereignty, but will ensure stability of Russian interests here (in particular,
pipelines, branches of Beltransgaz are meant) comes to power, Belarus will suit Russia as a good
neighbor and a reliable ally, and talks about the total unification would cease. In this case the inte-
gration of Belarus and Russia would become a part of the European integration process with sup-
port of both nations, as well as peoples of other countries.
9Local election – "spiral of silence" untwines
The elections to local Councils will take place in Belarus next spring. Only one fifth of the respon-
dents knows when they are to take place. However, that does not mean there is no interest in these
elections.
As we see from Table 11, today 60% of the respondents say they are ready to take part in local
elections. That is one third more than a month before the March 1999 elections, when, according to
our data, the same 60% participated (according to the data of the Central Election Commission –
64% of those having right to vote). And if we take into account the fact that out of 20% of those who
find it difficult to answer the majority is inclined to participate, one could suppose that next spring we
will see a high turnout.
But why not now? What are the reasons why a part of voters does not want to go to polling sta-
tions? Table 12 gives an idea about it.
Table 11
Distribution of answers to the question "Are you going to take part in the election to local
Councils?", %
Variant of answer 03'99 09'02
Yes 45.0 60.3
No 20.0 20.3
Do not know yet 34.0 –*
DA/NA 1.0 19.4
*The option was omitted in the given questionnaire
Table 12
Distribution of answers to the question "If you are not going to vote, then why?", %
(more than one answer is possible)
Variant of answer All
respondents
Supporters* of
. Lukashenko
Opponents* of
. Lukashenko
No matter how do you vote, the candidates who enjoy support of the
authorities would become deputies 12.2 4.3 16.2
There is no worthy candidate to support 8.1 2.3 11.5
I doubt the elections would be free and fair 8.6 3.6 12.2
It is useless to vote, because local Councils have no powers 9.8 4.2 13.7
I do not care about it 7.0 4.3 7.8
Let those who understand the situation vote 5.1 7.7 2.9
Other 1.8 2.4 1.2
* Convinced supporters are those who are ready to vote for A. Lukashenko at the Belarus presidential election and the presidential election
of the Russia-Belarus Union, who trust him and consider him an ideal politician. Convinced opponents are those who distrust the president
and choose another politician on all other issues
Table 13
Distribution of answers to the questions about nature of the future voting, %
Variant of answer For what candidate would
you prefer to vote?
For whom, do you think, the majority of
voters would vote?
04'02 09'02 04'02 09'02
For a candidate-supporter of A.
Lukashenko
29.2 27.9 49.5 35.0
For a candidate-opponent of A.
Lukashenko
28.3 30.8 16.5 25.3
For another candidate 15.2 16.5 6.6 7.4
DA/NA 27.3 24.8 27.4 32.3
This time, as in April, distrust tops the list. Voters do not believe that the strongest candidate will
win the race – more than 12% of the respondents (16.2% among the president’s opponents) think
that candidates who enjoy support of the authorities are likely to become deputies. If we add those
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who do not believe in a free and fair election, it turns out that 20% of all the respondents and about
30% of A. Lukashenko’s opponents are ready to ignore the elections because they doubt that would
be real elections, which depend only on voters’ will. At the same time we shall note that as com-
pared to the last year A. Lukashenko’s opponents look more optimistic – among them the number of
those who have no doubts the authorities would be able to push their proteges to local Councils
dropped by 5%.
Previously we have repeatedly stated that a considerable part of voters have no enough informa-
tion about candidates and their programs, and as a result they vote "at random". Nonetheless, they
make their choice on the basis of other criteria, having no information about the programs of candi-
dates, or their personal features. The attitude of this or that candidate towards A. Lukashenko and
his policy becomes one of the key indicators in this respect, an identification sign by which voters
distinguish "their" candidates from "strangers".
And here significant changes have taken place. If in April the number of those who were going to
vote for candidates-supporters of A. Lukashenko slightly exceeded the number of those ready to
vote for candidates-opponents of the president, in September the situation changed (See Table 13).
The amplitude of this change – 4% (from -1 in favor of supporters to +3 in favor of opponents). And
that coincides with the figures of the fall of the president’s rating.
However, the most considerable changes have taken place in voters’ estimation of how the rest
of voters would vote. In April many Belarusians speaking out for changes believed the majority
would vote for candidates-supporters of A. Lukashenko (i.e. that they are in the minority), today their
confidence in public support has increased. The spiral of silence repeatedly reported by IISEPS has
finally begun to untwine.
Table 14
Distribution of answers to the question "If you are going to support a candidate of one of the parties,
which in particular?", %
Variant of answer 04'02 09'02
Liberal-Democratic Party (S. Gaidukevich) 5.5 7.6
Women’s Party Nadzeya (V. Polevikova)* 4.3 6.9
Belarusian Social-Democratic Gramada (S. Shushkevich) 3.8 2.9
United Civic Party (  . Lebedko) 3.8 3.6
Belarusian Party of Communists (S. Kalyakin) 2.7 3.3
Belarusian Social-Democratic Party Narodnaya Gramada (N. Statkevich) 2.6 2.7
Belarusian Popular Front Adradzhenne (V. Vecherko) 2.0 3.1
Conservative-Christian Party of BPF (Z. Poznyak) 1.9 2.9
Communist Party of Belarus (V. Zakharchenko) 1.7 –*
Party of Labor (  . Bukhvostov) 1.4 1.6
Other 6.2 2.9
DA/NA 64.1 62.3
*The public opinion poll was conducted before the change of Nadzeya’s leadership
Table 15
Distribution of answers to the question "Do you support the creation of a block of opposition parties
for participation in the local elections?", %
Variant of
answer
All
respondents
A.  Lukashenko’s
supporters
A. Lukashenko’s
opponents
Vacillatory
04'02 09'02 04'02 09'02 04'02 09'02 04'02 09'02
Yes 36.5 39.8 7.9 14.3 57.1 57.5 21.0 30.2
No 32.8 31.0 57.9 60.5 18.8 18.1 42.1 35.6
 /   30.7 29.2 34.2 25.4 24.1 24.4 36.9 34.1
A. Lukashenko’s electorate diminishes in number and becomes more consolidated – 89% of his
supporters are going to vote for a candidate-supporter of the president, but their confidence in sup-
port of the majority is falling (only 77.8% believe the majority of voters would do the same).
The president’s opponents are less consolidated – 58.6% of them prefer voting for candidates-
opponents of the president, and 18.1% – for another candidate. But their confidence in support of
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the majority is going up – more than half of them think the majority will support their choice.
It is noteworthy that only 32.2% of the "vacillatory" are ready to support candidates-opponents of
A. Lukashenko and other candidates, and 36.2% – to vote in favor of candidates-supporters of
A. Lukashenko.
Table 16
Distribution of answers to the question
"Would you like moving to another country?"
Variant of answer %
I would not like moving anywhere 54.6
Germany 13.3
The USA 8.6
Poland 5.7
Russia 4.3
Baltic States 1.7
Another country 4.7
Although there is enough time before the elections, today it is clear that contradictions between
the opposition parties will not allow them creating a single election block. Judging by statements of
party leaders we could predict that at least two blocks – a left-centrist and a right-centrist block
would nominate their candidates next spring. The first block may include communist of S. Kalyakin,
social-democrats of A. Bukhvostov and N. Statkevich. Liberal-democrats of S. Gaidukevich and
Nadzeya with its new leadership (which has to solve the problem of registration with the Justice
Ministry first) will probably join them. The second block will most likely include the BPF "Adradzhen-
nye" of V. Vechorka, the UCP of A. Lebedko and probably two social-democratic parties of
S. Shushkevich and V. Polevikova (the latter also has to settle the issue of its registration).
We have repeatedly mentioned that party membership of candidates is not a determinative factor
for voters’ choice. Also it is still unclear whether or not voters who are ready to vote for a candidate
from another party of the given block would automatically support a party member. At first sight we
shall only state that the right-centrist block has a traditionally closer, more disciplined and consoli-
dated electorate. The left-centrist block seems to have a quantitatively greater potential (See Ta-
ble 14).
However, we shall not add party ratings mechanically. Still it is not clear who will gain the elector-
ate of the split Nadzeya, or will S. Gaidukevich (who is at a certain height) join a block.
Meanwhile, we shall note that the idea of a single block enlists more and more supporters (See
Table 15).
Ironically, if there are no changes on this issue among A. Lukashenko’s opponents (probably, be-
cause, mostly they are politically active citizens, many of whom have settled party preferences), the
support of this idea has increased 1.5fold among the "vacillatory" and almost twofold among
A. Lukashenko’s (!) supporters.
Do Belarusians want to the West?
As we could see from Table 16, a considerable part of our fellow citizens (almost 40%) would like
moving to another country. And western, or west-oriented countries dominate the list of preferences.
As for oriental countries, only Russia is mentioned. In a year its attractiveness for emigration has
crept up from 3.6% to 4.3%. Hence, a significant part of Belarusians considers western values at-
tractive, and they are even ready to leave the Fatherland.
How deep have these values penetrated into Belarusian socium, to what extent have they influ-
enced traditional public consciousness? Tables 2–6 provide a fair idea of it. As Table 17 shows,
contrary to regulations and actions by Belarus’ authorities, almost half of the population (48.5%) be-
lieves that regardless of its "distinctive nature" Belarus shall uphold international standards and do
not impede the activities of the OSCE.
Traditionally negative attitude towards the West as a whole and NATO in particular has changed
considerably. Today 41.2% (against 31.3%) believe that NATO’s eastward expansion is of no threat
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to Belarus (See Table 18). Previously the ratio was diametrically opposite. Although only 27.0% ad-
vocate Belarus’ accession to NATO (42.3% against it), the tendency of diminishing anti-NATO
moods is evident.
Table 17
Distribution of answers to the question "There is a new crisis in the relations between Belarus and
international organizations. International organizations believe that the OSCE AMG shall continue
working in Belarus, whereas the Belarus authorities say "we shall not bow before the OSCE", and in
fact froze the activity of this organization in our country. What, do you think, is the best way to over-
come the crisis?"
Variant of answer %
Belarus must uphold international standards, shall not impede the OSCE activities in our country 48.5
Belarus lives by its own rules, and the OSCE and other international organizations must observe them 25.6
Table 18
Dynamics of distribution of answers to the question "Does NATO’s
expansion pose threat to Belarus?", %
Variant of answer 06'99 11'99 04'01 09'02
Yes 17.6 20.2 23.5 41.2
No 47.7 43.7 36.8 31.3
Almost 60% of the respondent support Russia’s active policy aimed at rapprochement with the
West and recommend Belarus to follow the same path. Only 14.1% speak out against it. And finally,
if a referendum on joining the European Union were to take place tomorrow, 53.4% of the population
are ready to vote in favor of accession (See Table 19). It is worth mentioning that there has been
campaigning in this respect in the country, and the official position is clearly opposite.
Table 19
Distribution of answers to the question "If tomorrow there were a
referendum on Belarus’ accession to the European Union, how
would you vote?"
Variant of answer %
For 53.4
Against 8.1
Would not vote 13.0
That is a further proof of the fact that western values, western way of thinking and living become
more acceptable for Belarusians. Of course, the situation shall not be simplified. Many like the west-
ern level of incomes and consumption, but they do not accept the western labor moral and interper-
sonal relations. Nonetheless, one could state there are positive shifts in public consciousness, which
take place regardless of the aggressive anti-western propaganda.
The majority of Belarusians stand up for parity of religions
Belarus is known a multi-denomination country at the crossroads between Eastern and Western civi-
lizations and two branches of Christianity, respectively. Historically, the dominating religions in Be-
larus were Russian Orthodoxy and Roman Catholicism. However, after the bans imposed by the So-
viets were abolished many other religions showed rapid growth in the number of their followers dur-
ing the last decade. In this respect it would be of great interest to find out how Belarusians identify
themselves with respect to religion and how they regard optimal relations between various denomi-
nations. The latter is especially important in view of coming meeting of the Council of the Republic
that will consider in early October the amendments to the "Law on the freedom of religion and relig-
ious organizations" that earlier generated very contradictory reactions of many political figures, re-
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ligious heads and the very believers.
As we could see from Table 20, more than two thirds of the respondents identify themselves as
Orthodox believers, their number for the last year and a half increased by 10%. The number of
Catholics and Protestants has also grown during the mentioned period. Protestantism is often said
to be the most rapidly growing religion in Belarus.
It is noteworthy that the number of atheists and non-believers (being, in fact, the same) hasn’t
dropped. So, that is double reduction of those who didn’t identify themselves with any religion which
ensured the growth within other groups, as well as the choice of the simply Christians made in favor
of this or that branch of Christianity.
It is no secret that the present Belarus authorities are known to have close relations with the Or-
thodox Church. In fact, they often emphasize the point. President A. Lukashenko publicly called
himself an "Orthodox atheist". Therefore, the changes and amendments to the "Law on the freedom
of religion and religious organizations" adopted by the House of Representatives are said to be the
attempts to legalize the superiority of the dominating religions.
Table 20
Dynamics of distribution of answers to the question "What is
you religion?", % (open question)
Variant of answer 04'01 09'02
Orthodox 58.9 67.4
Catholic 9.8 13.1
Christian 11.8 7.4
Atheist 5.1 4.9
Non-believer 0.6 1.0
Protestant 0.3 0.6
Jew – 0.1
Moslem – 0.1
NA 13.4 5.6
Table 21
Distribution of answers to the question "The Chamber of Representatives has recently adopted the
new edition of the law approving "the leading role of the Orthodox Church" in our country. Some
people support it believing this is fair because the majority of Belarusian believers are Orthodox be-
lievers. Others speak out against it saying the law infringes upon the rights of other religions. What
do you think about it?, %
Variant of answer %
I think that the Orthodox Church shall be superior to other religions in Belarus 33.6
I think all churches shall enjoy equal rights in our country 57.7
These attempts are often oppositely interpreted. Thus, prominent Russian human rights activists
L. Ponomarev and G. Yakunin in an open address to the members of the National Assembly pointed
out that the given draft law "considerably restricts the freedom of religion for all the believers and
puts religious life under the humiliating state control". Furthermore, L. Ponomarev and G. Yakunin
note that "despite the principles of a law-abiding state the new draft law empowers local depart-
ments of justice to indefinitely suspend activity of religious organizations without court decision". Ac-
cording to the authors of the letter, "the draft law severely restricts possibility for a believer to spread
his beliefs, i.e. even officially registered religious communities are not allowed to have their publica-
tions. Before being distributed, all religious literature should undergo a religious expertise, which in
fact means the introduction of state church censorship in Belarus".
On the other hand, the Patriarchal Exarch of Belarus, Metropolitan of Minsk and Filaret of Slutsk
spoke out in favor of the draft law. In his opinion, the existing law "On the freedom of religion and re-
ligious organizations" adopted in 1992 does not respond to the real situation within society. Besides,
it is inferior to the European legislation as far as preserving cultural and spiritual heritage of people is
concerned. The Filaret noted that one of the sources of discontent on the part of young religious or-
ganizations formed 10–15 years ago is the preamble of the draft law stating the role of five tradi-
tional denominations in the history and culture of Belarus. The Metropolitan is confident that the new
law "would not infringe upon the rights of believers but, on the contrary, ensure additional opportuni-
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ties to the citizens to confess their faith". He also pinpoints that "in general all traditional religions
positively regard the draft law and have all approved it".
Table 22
Attitude to parity of denominations depending on religion*, %
Variant of answer Attitude towards the amendments to the law on religion,
approving the leading role of the Orthodox Church in Belarus
The Orthodox Church shall be superior to
other religions
All churches shall enjoy
equal rights DA/NA
Orthodox 41.4 51.7 6.9
Catholic 8.6 84.3 7.1
Christian 33.3 59.5 7.2
Atheist 8.2 63.0 28.8
Non-believer 14.3 50.0 35.7
Protestant 11.1 88.9 –
Jew – 100.0 –
Moslem – 100.0 –
DA 26.2 58.3 15.5
*To be read horizontally, for example, 84.3% of Catholics believe that all the churches shall enjoy equal rights
Now, what do people, 90% of which are the followers of this or that denomination think of the is-
sue?
As we see from Table 21, about 60% of the respondents stand for the parity of all churches. Only
a third of the respondents supported the idea of superiority for the Orthodox Church, despite the fact
that two thirds of the Belarusians identify themselves as Orthodox believers. That is a manifestation
of public wisdom and tolerance of the Belarusian people as well as aversion to discrimination and
disparity as far as relations between different denominations are concerned.
As one can see, apart from the vast majority of Catholics and Protestants, the overwhelming ma-
jority of atheists and Orthodox believers are of the same opinion (See Table 22). Obviously, the fig-
ures need to be thoroughly studied in the Council of the Republic so that while considering the draft
law its members take into account not only the arguments of the interested parties but also the
opinion of Belarusian citizens.
Shall Belarusians count on improvement of life?
Regardless of an active propaganda in state-run mass media of economic achievements of the
authorities, the population is still mainly concerned about social-economic problems. The most sig-
nificant among them are: price rise and impoverishment of the population (71.9% and 60.6% of the
answers, respectively). There is also an increased concern about unemployment (49.4%), what is an
evident of its latent growth.
Table 23
Change of the economic situation in Belarus over the last year, %
Variant of answer 04'00 10'00 08'01 10'01 04'02 09'02
Has deteriorated 64.8 57.5 35.9 29.2 55.5 50.0
Has remained unchanged 27.9 33.8 40.7 47.4 33.2 37.8
Has improved 7.0 7.5 16.9 17.8 7.7 5.9
Table  24
Dynamics of distribution of answers to the question "Please, state average income (including wages,
pensions and other incomes) for one family members last month:", %
Variant of answer 08'01 10'01 04'02 09'02
Below living wage budget 50.5 44.9 49.9 49.5
From living wage budget to minimum living wage 32.4 34.7 31.1 32.7
From living wage budget to $100 11.9 14.0 14.8 12.2
More than $100 4.6 5.8 4.2 5.6
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Table 23 clearly shows that there is a decrease in number of those who believe the economic
situation in the country has improved. During the last two and a half years the dynamics of such an-
swers proves the fact that the public sense of certain economic improvement, which took place in
2001, is closely related to the authorities’ efforts to intensify social expenses of legal entities during
the presidential election, rather than to a recovery of the national economy. After the 2001 election
the economy, as many expected, returned to its usual condition, and the survey results reflect the
tendency.
Today only every seventh (13.8%) believes that during A. Lukashenko’s ruling his life and life of
his family has improved. Every second (48.5%) thinks in the opposite. That is a further proof of an
unfavorable economic situation in the country.
As we see from Table 24, the structure of the population by the level of incomes per capita has
not changed recently (excluding the presidential campaign). Almost half of Belarusians (49.5%) live
below the poverty line (the minimum wage budget), another third (32.7%) has incomes below the
level of simple reproduction (the minimum living wage). In other words, 82.2% of our fellow citizens
could hardly make ends meet.
Aside form low incomes, the population is concerned about backpays in wages and pensions.
During the last year two thirds of the respondents (67.4%) have faced such problem, and 55.4% –
have faced it repeatedly.
Table 25
Distribution of answers to the question "How would you assess the work of Belarus’ authorities on a
5-grade scale?", %
Institution Grade
1 2 3 4 5 On average
President 17.6 20.5 30.7 21.1 8.3 2.82
Government 18.1 27.5 37.2 12.9 2.6 2.54
Parliament 20.3 28.7 35.5 11.5 2.2 2.46
Local authorities 24.0 25.1 31.4 14.8 2.7 2.46
If the above data proves there are serious grounds to be concerned about the social-economic
situation in the country, the survey materials demonstrate that the population lacks optimism re-
garding an improvement of the situation in the future. Two thirds of the respondents (66.3%) predict
the economic situation to deteriorate or to remain unchanged. Only every sixth respondent sounds
optimistic in this respect (16.9%).
Every second respondent (49.1%) is confident the state of affairs in our country develops in a
wrong direction. Right after the election 38.1% of the respondents gave a similar answer. As of to-
day, only 21.3% of voters believe the country develops in the right direction.
Only every fourth (24.4%) expects the authorities to improve the situation, and every fifth (20%) –
expects stability. Almost one-third (30.7%) expects nothing from Belarus’ authorities, they rely only
on themselves. As for other public interests, an insignificant number of the respondents expects the
authorities to realize them. The data proves the population does not believe the authorities are able
to solve the pressing problems of public life.
To certain degree 57.2% of the respondents are not satisfied with A. Lukashenko’s ruling. Only
39.1% think in the opposite.
The activity of all branches and levels of state authorities is assessed very low by the population
(See Table 25). As one could see, on average none of the presented institutions enjoys a satisfac-
tory grade. Probably for that reason the number of those who trust any state institutions (excluding
the army) is much smaller than the number of those who have no trust at all.
Thus, it seems there is no point for Belarusians in setting hopes and expecting our authorities to
improve the economic situation in the country.
Chances of alternative
"Who could oppose A. Lukashenko today? Who needs cosmic rating to be invented?" – Rakhat Lu-
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kumov asks sarcastically in the editor’s column of Sovetskaya Belorussia ("respectable newspaper
for respectable people"), ardently "denouncing" the results of latest studies by "independent sociolo-
gists". But why should someone oppose the president if "A. Lukashenko remains the acknowledged
leader and if there were an election today – the result would have been the same as last year!"
Naturally, why? The country prospers, wages and pensions rise, investments come in, birth rate in-
creases, and numerous international organizations repeatedly invite Belarus to join them… There is
no need to be a sociologist or psychologist to imagine the expression of anyone who reads these
lines – from the president himself and Mr. Lukumov to common citizens. The majority of Belarusians
knows (or at least feels) the truth – for that purpose "respectable people" have only to get off their
BMW or Mercedes and take a city bus or trolley-bus in any settlement and in any direction. But we
shall not turn to the common level of the discussion, let’s better consider the findings of the latest
public opinion poll.
How many people in Belarus read independent press, which publishes results of opinion polls
conducted by non-state research centers? We will not argue about figures – clearly, much less than
state-run press. Undoubtedly, neither the "respectable newspaper" nor the Belarusian television re-
ports the falling president’s rating. This is how Belarusians reacted to a simple question regarding
A. Lukashenko’s rating (See Table 26).
Table 26
Distribution of answers to the question "Do you think A. Lukashenko’s rating (i.e. people’s readiness
to vote for him at the next election) has increased or decreased since the 2001 presidential lec-
tion?"
Variant of answer %
Has decreased 59.8
Has increased 17.2
DA/NA 23.0
Table  27
Distribution of answers to the question "Do you know a candidate who could successfully compete
with A. Lukashenko at the next presidential election?"
Variant of answer %
Yes, I know 15.8
No, I do not know 82.1
Table 28
Comparative analysis of electoral preferences of different groups of voters, %
If the following politicians were candidates at the next
presidential election, could vote for:
All
respondents
(100)
Convinced
A. Lukashenko’s
opponents
(41.7)
Know an
alternative to
A. Lukashenko
(15.8)
 
. Lukashenko 17.8 0 3.4
Candidate, chosen successor of   . Lukashenko 7.1 0 3.4
V. Vecherko (BPF Adradzhenne) * 3.6 5.5
S. Gaidukevich (LDPB) 7.7 13.6 25.4
S. Kalyakin (BCP) * * 3.0
 
. Lebedko (UCP) * 5.1 6.4

. Marinich (Delovaya Initsiativa) * 4.5 5.5
Z. Poznyak (CCP of BPF) * 4.7 8,9
V. Polevikova (Nadzeya)** 3.5 6.8 3.4
Another candidate 5.4 7.2 10.6
Do not know yet, will judge by circumstances 40.5 44.4 16.9
* The ratings of these politicians is below the margin of error (3%)
** The questionnaire was worked out before the USDP congress
For each person who is confident that the president’s rating increased, there are four those who
believe it fell. And there are twofold more regular readers of Sovetskaya Belorussia than of Narod-
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naya Volya in the latter group! As the saying goes, murder will out.
Table 29
Comparative analysis of the electorate knowing the candidate who could successfully compete with
A. Lukashenko at the presidential election, and those who do not know such candidate, %
Social characteristics Know Do not know
Estimation of the economic situation in Belarus over the last year:
· has improved 4.7 6.1
· has remained unchanged 29.4 39.3
· has deteriorated 60.1 48.7
Would wish their children do private business:
· yes 70.2 48.7
· no 15.3 30.7
Satisfied with A. Lukashenko’s ruling:
· rather/partially satisfied 15.3 43.8
· rather/partially dissatisfied 82.1 52.9
Our country develops:
· in the right direction 9.7 23.5
· in a wrong direction 68.7 46.0
Would like emigrate:
· yes 51.4 35.6
· would not like moving anywhere 39.8 57.9
Estimation of law observance in the country:
· all are equal before the law and a perpetrator shall account for any crime 7.7 16.9
· those who hold high posts could escape punishment 45.2 32.1
Estimation of change of authorities during A. Lukashenko’s rule:
· power and arbitrariness of authorities have increased 64.2 39.2
· power and arbitrariness of authorities have decreased 21.0 35.8
Believe that after the 2001 presidential election A. Lukashenko’s rating:
· has increased 7.2 19.1
· has decreased 80.4 56.5
At a possible referendum on changing the Constitution to make A. Lukashenko eligible for the third consecutive term
would vote:
· for such changes 4.2 17.9
· against such changes 77.9 46.2
At the election to local Council in spring 2003 would prefer to vote for:
· candidate-supporters of A. Lukashenko 6.2 32.1
· candidate-opponent of A. Lukashenko 57.1 26.1
· another candidate 24.1 14.7
Support the integration of Belarus and Russia:
· on the principles of the European Union 65.6 45.7
· by means of Belarus becoming part of Russia 17.8 22.9
At a possible referendum on the question suggested by V. Putin in August (the unification of Belarus and Russia on
three principles):
· would say they agree 23.0 34.4
· would say they disagree 41.7 23.7
· will judge by circumstances 26.8 32.7
Believe that Belarus shall uphold the same course for rapprochement with the West as Russia does:
· yes 70.5 56.8
· no 11.7 14.4
Confidence in non-state mass media:
· trust 50.2 29.3
· distrust 35.9 41.6
Confidence in non-state research centers:
· trust 52.4 35.0
· distrust 23.0 25.8
Attitude towards the recent court trials of non-state newspapers:
· consider fair 7.3 18.0
· consider unfair 66.6 35.7
Attitude towards introduction of state control over study and formation of public opinion:
· support 12.8 19.4
· do not support 74.6 54.7
But Mr. Lukumov’s question is not an idle one. Until it remains unanswered, Belarus will plunge
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deeper into the past, and its citizens will more often think about emigration (as of today, about 40%
of Belarusians would like to move to another country). Do Belarusians have chances of an alterna-
tive? We’ll try to answer this question (See Table 27).
As we see, the majority of our fellow citizens (five against one) see no alternative to the president,
although they begin thinking about it. However, a correlation analysis of the answers to this question
revealed a striking fact: 3fold more people among those who believe that A. Lukashenko’s rating
dropped after the 2001 presidential election know an alternative candidate than among those who
say it went up. That means that the first condition for the appearance of an alternative – awareness
of the majority of the population of the president’s real rating – is met.
Let’s see if such an alternative can appear in the circle of political opposition (See Table 28).
At first sight, the picture is not very comforting: only two opposition politicians enjoy rating ex-
ceeding the margin of error, and more than 40% of the respondents cannot make their choice. We
have witnessed a similar picture for many years already. But there are new important circumstances.
First, A. Lukashenko’s rating (together with his possible successor) levels at 25% (open rating, as we
have recently reported, is 27% today), what is 20% less than during his first term of presidency.
Second, if among A. Lukashenko’s convinced opponents and the electorate as a whole the number
of those who are ready to vote for an alternative candidate is almost equal to the number of those
who have not made their choice yet, then among those who know such a candidate there are 4fold
more voters who are determined with the alternative candidate than those undecided yet. That
means the knowledge of such an alternative is the most important factor for choosing an alternative
candidate. In other words, the candidate’s personal features, his political program, team, etc., are
secondary factors under such conditions. The main thing is that the candidate appears not only on
political arena, but in public consciousness. Another important proof of this statement: 15% of those
who know about the alternative candidate are people who a year ago … voted for A. Lukashenko!
Having known the alternative, they are ready to reject the former idol. Knowledge is power! That is
the second condition of a real alternative, which, unlike the first one, has not been met yet.
But how such knowledge could be achieved? A comparative analysis of these electoral groups on
social-demographic profile revealed almost no critical differences between them (which could explain
knowledge or absence of knowledge about A. Lukashenko’s possible competitor). Expectedly,
among those who know such a candidate, there are more men, people with higher level of educa-
tion, youth, students, people working in the private sector, residents of the capital having higher in-
comes. And on the contrary, among those who do not know such a candidate, there are more
women, people with lower level of education, aged people, pensioners, residents of towns and vil-
lages having lower incomes.
People’s moods, their vision of the most important problems of social-economic and public-
political development of the country play a great role in their desire to know more about a possible
alternative (See Table 29).
The difference between these groups is obvious: those who know the alternative candidate are
dominated by supporters of democracy, market economy, law-abiding state and Belarus’ independ-
ence. But there are no mirror-like distributions, with minor exceptions, among these electoral groups.
That means unlike other "dividing lines" of Belarus’ electorate (on its attitude towards the president
and his course, the integration with Russia, etc.), the groups of "knowledge – lack of knowledge of
an alternative to A. Lukashenko" are not antagonistic. In turn, that means such division could be
overcome: if people know the president’s real rating and an alternative candidate, a considerable
part of the second group may join the first group and form the majority of the electorate. The last ta-
ble reveals the most important mechanisms to meet the second condition – non-state research cen-
ters studying public opinion and non-state press publishing findings of this study (we shall also note
that in conditions of the Belarusian information space Russia’s research centers and TV channels
could play the same and even a bigger role).
As we see today there is no one to "invent a cosmic rating for" – neither the opposition leaders,
nor the president. Unlike Rakhat Lukumov and his colleagues stuffing "respectable people" with
tales about the "firmness of the acknowledged leader" (probably such "throwing dust in people’s
eyes" is their latent Fronde?), on the basis of the received data we state that if the above conditions
are met Belarus could have a chance of a real alternative. Who and how will use these chances –
the opposition, the president or his entourage (by means of launching true reforms), a "third" or
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maybe "outside force" – remains as open question. But the one who skillfully takes advantages of
them will become the winner.
Slogan of the day – rely on yourself. The majority of Belarusians does not believe in positive
changes and relies on themselves
Social optimism is the indicator determining the current condition of the society. Obviously, sooner or
later Belarus will have to face painful economic reforms, which should be carried out with knowledge
of the population’s possible reaction at the situation when the ability of each person to help himself
is key to success. The necessity to keep the present social-economic order President
A. Lukashenko explains by reluctance to carry out reforms and "break Belarusians" who are accus-
tomed to care from the side of the state. He called the Belarusian economic model his "major
achievement", and at the latest press conference he stated that the policy of the present authorities
would remain unchanged because it enjoys support of the majority of the population. But the popu-
lation, as we could see (See Table 5 on Page 35), has a different vision of the situation.
Since the 2001 presidential election the number of the respondents who believe that Belarus de-
velops in a wrong direction – we shall call them pessimists – has been twofold bigger than the num-
ber of optimists – those who think in the opposite.
Table 30
Distribution of answers to the question "Are you satisfied with
A. Lukashenko’s ruling ", %
Variant of answer All
respondents
A. Lukashenko’s
supporters
A. Lukashenko’s
opponents
Rather satisfied 12.9 57.9 0.4
Partially satisfied 26.2 36.1 5.5
Partially dissatisfied 20.7 4.5 21.5
Rather dissatisfied 36.5 0.9 70.5
And the direction of the country’s development, as we know, is to a great extent determined by
activity of the head of state. At present estimation of his professional activity is that (See Table 30)
the president’s success, recognition of his managerial merits is out of the question – to some extent
about 60% of the respondents are dissatisfied with A. Lukashenko’s ruling. We have already ac-
customed to the mirror picture of answers of the president’s supporters and opponents in such case.
As well as to the fact that Belarus’ youth as a whole, not taking into account its political views, is
negative about the present leader – 20.6% of the respondents aged 18–29 partially dissatisfied,
53.4% – rather dissatisfied with A. Lukashenko’s ruling.
Dissatisfaction with the present causes scepsis with respect to the future (See Table 31). One-
third of the respondents expects the social-economic situation to deteriorate in the future, whereas
only twofold less Belarusians still cherish hopes for improvement. A. Lukashenko’s supporters and
opponents demonstrate the diametrical opposition of their views. The young generation, what is
quite expressive, is inclined to share the point of view of the latter group – 41% of the respondents
aged 18–29 have no doubts the social-economic situation will deteriorate, and only 10.2% hope for
the better.
Table 31
Distribution of answers to the question "How would the economic situation in Belarus
change in the years to come?", %
Variant of answer All
respondents
A. Lukashenko’s
supporters
A. Lukashenko’s oppo-
nents
Would improve 16.9 50.0 2.6
Would remain unchanged 31.6 20.6 31.1
Would deteriorate 34.7 5.8 57.3
The reasons for such a skeptical vision of the future of Belarusians could be explained with the
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data of Table 32. It turns out that Belarusians do not expect authorities to start economic reforms,
rapprochement with Russia or the West, mostly they rely on themselves (30.7%). On the one hand,
that is not bad – people with such liberal motto (help yourself!) are hard to be manipulated, they form
the social basis for changes and are ready to stand inevitable hardships. On the other hand, with the
dominating paternalist model of state these figures prove it failed.
Naturally, A. Lukashen-ko’s supporters, who are to a great extent recipients of state aid and so-
cial outsiders, are quite satisfied with such policy, and they expect the authorities, first of all, to en-
sure stability (34.7%). Whereas A. Lukashenko’s opponents – the most dynamic and educated part
of the society, rejecting the present stability (for many it is a synonym of the absence of possibilities
for self-realization) and doubting economic reforms –count on themselves more than the rest of Be-
larusians.
Table 32
Distribution of answers to the question "What do you expect from the present
authorities?", %
Variant of answer All
respondents
A. Lukashenko’s
supporters
A. Lukashenko’s
opponents
I expect nothing from the
authorities, I rely only on myself 30.7 15.1 43.0
I expect an improvement of the
economic situation 24.4 27.9 15.9
I expect stability 20.0 34.7 12.1
The integration with
Russia 10.5 12.5 12.5
Economic reforms 7.3 4.6 8.4
Rapprochement with the West 3.2 0.5 4.9
But if we have to live in line with this principle, it would be better to do it where there are more fa-
vorable conditions for success of active and dynamic people. A considerable part of the youth is
prone to draw such conclusion: 38.3% of all the respondents want to move abroad, among those
aged 18–29 – the figure is 63.4%.
Table 33
Distribution of answers to the question "Are you personally ready to
openly express your political views?"
Variant of answer %
I have never been afraid of openly expressing my political views 43.8
Sometimes I am afraid of expressing my political views 36.3
Often I am afraid of openly expressing my political views 17.8
But how dissatisfaction with the current situation in the country, its present leader, and also doubt
of positive changes and absence of illusions influence Belarusians’ political mood? As we see from
Table 33, regardless of the state propaganda and the repressive machine, more than 40% of the re-
spondents are never afraid of expressing their political views.
In fact, when earlier we asked the question "Do you think people are ready to openly express
their political views?", the picture was more pessimistic – about 70% of the respondents were confi-
dent that to a different extent Belarusians are afraid of expressing their views. When we asked the
question to the respondents, we saw more courage. It turns out that people think better of them-
selves than of others.
And those who stand up for their interests publicly enjoy today a favorable attitude – more than
two thirds of the respondents consider actions of small entrepreneurs (who recently carried out a
100,000-strong strike against increasing taxes and other limitations on their activity from the side of
the state) reasonable (unreasonable – only one fifth).
Will labor unions become the support of authorities?
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As we know, during the 2001 presidential election a part of labor unions elite, previously loyal to
A. Lukashenko, tried to play against him. Although the attempt failed, that was enough for the
authorities to understand the potential force of the largest public organization of the country and how
efficient a skillful application of such potential could be.
Shortly after the election the authorities launched a directed policy with regard to the Belarusian
Federation of Labor Unions to put it under total control. The introduction of a new procedure to col-
lect labor-union dues, the replacement of V. Goncharik with F. Vitko under the pressure of authori-
ties and then the latter with L. Kozik, the dismissal of A. Starikevich, the editor of Belarusky Chas pe-
riodical, the dismissal of A. Yaroshuk, the leader of agricultural labor unions – are the most `expres-
sive stages of that policy.
Today we could state that the ultimate goal has almost been achieved. The BFLU is no longer a
headache for the authorities, and the restoration of the old procedure of collecting dues through ac-
counts departments is a proof of it. Earlier the Constitutional Court found its abolition legal.
We shall admit that the "sweeping up" in the BFLU ranks caused no wide resonance among labor un-
ion masses. International organizations protested threatening with sanctions for violating the procedure of
personnel changes, opposition politicians expressed solidarity, independent press provided a detailed
coverage of what was going on. But labor union "masses" remained silent.
Table 34
Dynamics of trust to labor unions, %
Variant of answer 10'98 11'99 10'00 10'01 10'02
Labor unions of the BFLU
– trust
– distrust
14.9
29.2
17.8
33.0
18.6
32.3
22.2
36.7
21.0
39.4
Independent and free labor unions
– trust
– distrust
14.5
27.1
19.8
28.5
18.9
27.4
25.5
36.2
27.5
34.0
What is the reason for such a passive attitude? In fact, on the example of the BFLU the authori-
ties worked through a scenario of taking non-state structures under control if their activity do not suit
them. Obviously, after the given precedent such scenario could successfully be used against any
other organization.
Last February IISEPS predicted a possible split of the BFLU, a part of which could turn into free
labor unions, the rest – "yellow" labor unions. Today the reality is a bit different: the entire BFLU is
put under control, although we shall not exclude an exodus of industrial labor unions, the leadership
of which does not want to be an instrument of promoting policy of state authorities. So far the BFLU
has failed to become a real factor of public-political life. The gap between the democratic leaders of
the BFLU and the apathy of labor union masses, and dependence of grass root organizations on the
administration proved too big.
The fact that the BFLU "sweeping up" was quite calm could probably be explained by a low public
respect for labor unions. Only 21% of the respondents say they trust the BFLU structures, whereas
almost twofold more people distrust them. At the same time, 27.5% of the respondents trust free and
independent labor unions, and 34.0% distrust them.
In the background of other state and public institutions labor unions look not so bad, leaving be-
hind the government, political parties, KGB, the Central Election Commission and the National As-
sembly. Independent labor unions are placed higher if we have a look at the dynamics of the level of
trust over the last 5 years (See Table 34). The number of those who trust them has jumped almost
twofold (of those who distrust – only by 7%).
The figures of the BFLU are more modest. But it could hardly count on a better place. Over the
ten years of Belarus’ independence the BFLU labor unions have failed to adjust to the changes that
take place. They are no longer driving belts of the USSR Communist Party, since the latter ceased
its existence, but they have not become true advocates of workers’ interests. And they have to pay
for it.
Considering the attitude of these two groups (those who trust free labor unions and labor unions
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of the BFLU), it turns out that less than two thirds (61.2%) of the former group simultaneously trust
labor union of the BFLU, whereas 80% of the latter group trust free and independent labor unions.
That is a further proof of the fact that free and independent labor unions enjoy a wider authority with
those who are not dissatisfied with labor unions.
In fact, A. Lukashenko’s supporters see labor unions in a more positive light than his opponents,
both the BFLU and free labor unions: 30.9% of the president’s supporters say they trust labor unions
of the BFLU, and 26.4% — free labor unions (distrust – 31.1% and 25.0%, respectively).
A. Lukashenko’s opponents are more skeptical – only 14.6% of them trust the BFLU labor unions
(4fold more of them distrust labor unions) and 30.6% trust free and independent labor unions (42.6%
distrust them).
Of course, Belarusians have their own vision of the latest events within the BFLU and the place
and role of labor unions in our life. The replacement of F. Vitko with L. Kozik was carried out without
ceremony and simply could not win the sympathy of the population. A little more than one fourth of
the respondents accept the replacement and consider labor unions’ support of the presidential policy
necessary. At the same time half of the respondents believe labor unions shall not support the policy
of the president if it does not correspond to workers’ interests (See Table 35).
Table 35
Distribution of answers to the question "Recently F. Vitko, head of the Federation of Labor Unions,
who criticized the current social-economic course, has been replaced with L. Kozik, deputy head of
the Presidential Administration, who, as many believe, would ensure labor unions’ support t
A. Lukashenko’s policy. Some people agree with this replacement, others disagree. What do you
think about it?", %
Variant of answer All
respondents
A. Lukashenko’s
supporters
A.  Lukashenko’s
opponents
I agree: labor unions shall support the policy of the
president, if it corresponds to workers’ interests 26.5 69.2 7.9
I disagree: labor unions shall not support the policy
of the president, if it does not corresponds to work-
ers’ interests 50.9 8.3 76.9
DA/NA 22.6 22.5 15.2
The respondents having different attitude towards the latest reshuffling in the BFLU live in similar
conditions (both groups face backpays equally), but their political and economic views are absolutely
different. So, for example, the majority of the respondents who think labor unions shall support the
policy of the president rather (30.7%) or partially (41.4%) satisfied with A. Lukashenko’s ruling. Their
opponents see his activity in a different light: 2.2% and 16.4%, respectively. Being satisfied with the
present (almost half is confident the country develops in the right direction), the first group is opti-
mistic about the future (41.9% say the economic situation in the country will improve, 4fold less re-
spondents say it will deteriorate). They link the future to the name of the present head of state (at
the presidential election 84.3% voted for A. Lukashenko, 59.1% are ready to support him again, and
43.6% support the abolition of the Constitutional norm of two presidential terms).
On the contrary, the second group emphasizes that the country develops in a wrong direction
(72.2%), prospects for an improvement of the economic situation seem rather vague (4.9% – it will
improve, 50.9% – it will deteriorate). At the presidential election they voted more actively for
V. Goncharik (33.9%) than for A. Lukashenko (25.4%), they are negative about the Constitutional
norm of two presidential terms (78.3%) and are less ready (8.2%) to support him at a new presiden-
tial election (compare: S. Gaidukevich received 10.6%).
Summing it up we shall note that although the authorities managed to take the BFLU under con-
trol, its present condition, authority with the society, efficiency, etc., raise serious doubts about its
usage as an effective instrument of promoting interests of the authorities.
Will private business help Belarusians?
What Belarusians are guided by in their uncomfortable life? Why the overwhelming majority keeps
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silent about the absence of progress in the sphere of economy and living standards? We shall run
the risks of assuming that fear is the most significant factor determining such behavior of the major-
ity of Belarusians. A too big part of public life is under the state, it regulates public relations too rig-
idly, it thrusts its leading and guiding role too actively. It resulted in a low independence of the ma-
jority while solving their life problems, concern about their future and humble expectation of manna
from authorities (See Table 36). As we could see, less than one third of the respondents (30.3%) is
optimistic about job problems, whereas 45.3% are pessimistic in this respect and have to hold to it.
Supposedly, many "optimists" set hopes upon private business. Although the situation in the pri-
vate business is rather complex, it continues to develop attracting new supporters. The data of Ta-
ble 11 on Page 36 proves it to some degree. As one could see, over the last three years the number
of those who wish their children to do private business has jumped almost 1.5fold.
Tables 37 and 38 are an indirect proof of a certain development of the private business. Almost
the entire population actively uses services of private trading outlets (See Table 37). Only 7.5% of
the respondents say they never do it. Almost one third of citizens (30.7%) earns living using their
own property or means of production (See Table 38).
Table  36
Distribution of answers to the question "Which of the below state-
ments corresponds to your position?"
Variant of answer %
If for some reasons I lose my main job, it will undermine my welfare
and the welfare of my family. It will be very difficult to find other
sources of income 45.3
If for some reasons I lose my main job, most likely I will find other
ways to earn living and provide for my family 30.3
Table 37
Distribution of answers to the question "Numerous private trading
outlets have appeared over the recent years – from large clothing and
automobile markets to small kiosks. How often do you use their serv-
ices?"
Variant of answer %
Several times a week 41.5
Several times a month 36.8
Several times a year 13.6
I never use their services 7.5
Table 38
Distribution of answers to the question "Do you possess immovables
or means of production (land plot, vehicle, tractor, trading equipment,
other machinery) which you use to earn money?"
Variant of answer %
Yes 30.7
No 68.5
Not surprisingly, two thirds of the respondents (67.4%) consider reasonable the protest of small
entrepreneurs against attempts to limit their activity, which resulted in a large nationwide strike. Only
11.9% of the respondents think in the opposite.
Thus, the development of economic relations gradually involves more Belarusians to support pri-
vate enterprise. That gives some hopes for the future.
To the issue of land
As we know, after a long struggle against the left Russia’s Duma approved the new land code, which
envisions turnover of agricultural land. This big victory was actively debated in Russian mass media,
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especially electronic mass media, and it could not slip by unnoticed for Belarusians. Considerable
changes in land relations have taken place in the Ukraine. Probably, as a result, our country sees a
liberalization of public opinion on the issue of land relations. In particular, Table 39 shows that there
are 28.6% of opponents of land turnover in Belarus, whereas five years ago the figure was 36.6%.
There is certain progress regarding the possibility for foreigners to own land in Belarus (See Ta-
ble 40). Although 66.1% of the respondent still oppose it, nonetheless, the tendency of the last five
years is obvious. The authorities, however, continue to impede the process saying "our people are
not ready for it".
Table 39
Dynamics of distribution of answers to the question "Is trade turnover
of land possible in Belarus?", %
Variant of answer 06'97 09'02
Possible without limitations 7.4 8.1
Possible with certain limitations 45.5 52.5
Impossible at all 36.6 28.6
Table 40
Dynamics of distribution of answers to the question "Is it possible for
foreigners to be able to own land in Belarus?", %
Variant of answer 06'97 09'02
Yes 13.0 20.4
No 75.4 66.1
The population’s estimation of another Belarusian phenomenon is of great interest – here we
mean emergency measures and public intercom meetings at harvest time, these rudiments of so-
cialism, the brightest political show of each summer. Today more than 44% of the respondents view
it positively, because otherwise, in their opinion, the country would starve. However, the same num-
ber of respondents say these measures is a feeble semblance of the authorities’ care about the
people.
Results of the nation opinion poll,
conducted by IISEPS in September of 2002, %
1. Distribution of answers to the question: "Estimate the work of the Belarus president on a 5-grade
scale " (1 mark– "poor", 5 marks – "excellent")
Table 1.1. Depending on age
Variant of answer All Age, years old
respondents 18-19 20-24 25-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60+up
1 mark 17.6 22.8 27.2 29.8 20.6 16.5 13.3 9.4
2 marks 20.5 28.3 31.5 28.3 26.4 23.6 14.7 7.9
3 marks 30.7 35.2 26.1 31.4 31.1 34.8 36.0 21.9
4 marks 21.1 12.2 9.1 7.4 14.2 18.1 28.8 35.7
5 marks 8.3 1.5 4.1 1.6 5.8 3.7 7.2 22.7
DA/NA 1.8 0 2.0 1.5 1.9 3.3 0 2.4
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Table 1.2. Depending on education
Education
Variant of answer Elementary Incomplete
secondary
Secondary Secondary
vocational
Higher
(incomplete higher)
1 mark 9.4 10.8 18.7 19.1 25.8
2 marks 6.6 15.6 23.0 24.9 23.3
3 marks 18.5 26.3 34.5 32.8 32.2
4 marks 35.7 30.1 18.0 18.0 13.2
5 marks 25.5 16.5 4.6 3.4 3.4
DA/NA 4.3 0.7 1.2 1.8 2.1
Table 1.3. Depending on status
Status
Variant of answer Employees of the
private sector
Employees of
the public sector
Students Pensioners Unemployed,
housewives
1 mark 29.5 18.1 26.1 9.4 16.8
2 marks 25.6 24.1 27.7 9.2 26.7
3 marks 33.2 34.5 35.3 21.6 33.3
4 marks 8.6 18.0 7.4 36.5 14.4
5 marks 2.8 3.1 2.4 21.3 6.1
DA/NA 0.3 2.2 1.3 2.0 2.7
Table 1.4. Depending on place of living
Area
Variant of answer Minsk Minsk
region
Brest and
region
Grodno
and region
Vitebsk
and region
Mogilev and
region
Gomel and
region
1 mark 29.5 13.9 10.0 21.1 21.8 11.9 13.8
2 marks 21.8 12.8 20.1 24.4 25.0 17.1 22.6
3 marks 24.5 26.7 38.2 34.7 27.4 29.7 34.8
4 marks 13.0 25.6 24.8 17.7 18.5 30.0 19.9
5 marks 9.2 13.5 6.6 2.1 6.7 10.8 8.3
DA/NA 2.0 7.5 0.3 0 0.6 0.5 0.6
Table 1.5. Depending on type of settlement
Variant of answer Type of settlement
Capital Regional centers Cities Towns Village
1 mark 29.5 12.2 11.7 16.3 18.0
2 marks 21.8 25.6 24.9 14.6 18.4
3 marks 24.5 37.4 29.1 33.0 29.4
4 marks 13.0 18.8 24.9 20.2 25.5
5 marks 9.2 5.8 3.8 15.6 6.8
DA/NA 2.0 0.2 5.6 0.3 1.9
2. Distribution of answers to the question: "Do you think A. Lukashenko’s rating (i.e. people’s readi-
ness to vote for him at the next election) has increased or decreased since the 2001 presidential elec-
tion?"
Table 2.1. Depending on age
Variant of answer All Age, years old
respondents 18-19 20-24 25-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60+up
Has increased 17.2 11.7 7.8 3.9 8.6 14.3 18.4 34.9
Has decreased 59.8 66.9 75.0 74.0 70.9 65.2 57.9 35.7
DA/NA 23.0 21.4 17.2 22.1 20.5 20.5 23.7 29.4
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Table 2.2. Depending on education
Education
Variant of answer Elementary Incomplete
secondary
Secondary Secondary
vocational
Higher
(incomplete higher)
Has increased 29.6 31.2 12.1 14.7 10.2
Has decreased 31.3 47.6 66.1 66.8 68.5
DA/NA 39.1 21.2 21.8 18.5 21.3
Table 2.3. Depending on status
Status
Variant of answer Employees of
the private sector
Employees of
the public sector
Students Pensioners Unemployed,
housewives
Has increased 8.2 11.1 8.4 35.0 7.4
Has decreased 73.2 66.1 75.8 37.0 72.3
DA/NA 18.6 22.8 15.8 28.0 20.3
Table 2.4. Depending on place of living
Area
Variant of
answer
Minsk Minsk
region
Brest
and region
Grodno
and region
Vitebsk
and region
Mogilev and
region
Gomel and
region
Has increased 14.4 20.5 22.2 6.3 11.8 26.5 17.9
Has decreased 57.1 49.8 64.4 73.7 63.5 46.7 64.8
DA/NA 28.5 29.7 13.4 20.0 24.7 26.8 17.3
Table 2.5. Depending on type of settlement
Variant of answer Type of settlement
Capital Regional centers Cities Towns Village
Has increased 14.4 16.4 17.3 16.7 19.4
Has decreased 57.1 71.9 48.2 61.4 58.7
DA/NA 28.5 11.7 34.5 21.9 21.9
3. Distribution of answers to the question: "If there were a referendum on changing the Constitution of
Belarus to make A. Lukashenko eligible for the third term of presidency, how would you vote?"
Table 3.1. Depending on age
Variant of answer All Age, years old
respondents 18-19 20-24 25-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60+up
Would vote for such changes 15.5 6.0 6.0 2.6 5.3 10.8 19.5 35.1
Would vote against such changes 50.6 60.1 69.6 67.7 61.6 57.6 44.2 24.8
Do not know yet 25.4 24.7 14.9 23.8 25.4 24.6 28.8 28.7
Would not take part in the referendum 7.2 9.2 9.0 4.5 6.6 5.9 6.6 9.1
NA 1.3 0 0.5 1.4 1.1 1.4 0.9 2.3
Table 3.2. Depending on education
Education
Variant of answer Elementary Incomplete
secondary
Secondary Secondary
vocational
Higher
(incomplete higher)
Would vote for such changes 30.3 30.7 11.1 10.6 7.3
Would vote against such changes 21.3 32.9 53.1 61.1 69.4
Do not know yet 33.2 28.1 27.3 21.5 17.3
Would not take part in the referendum 10.9 8.2 7.4 5.8 4.8
NA 4.3 0.1 1.1 1.0 1.2
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Table 3.3. Depending on status
Status
Variant of answer Employees of
the private
sector
Employees of
the public
sector
Students Pensioners Unemployed,
housewives
Would vote for such changes 4.9 9.3 4.3 34.6 7.9
Would vote against such changes 70.3 57.1 69.3 25.5 54.2
Do not know yet 17.5 26.4 18.5 29.0 26.3
Would not take part in the referendum 7.0 6.1 6.8 8.8 10.5
NA 0.3 1.1 1.0 2.1 1.1
Table 3.4. Depending on place of living
Area
Variant of answer Minsk Minsk
region
Brest and
region
Grodno
and region
Vitebsk
and region
Mogilev
and region
Gomel and
region
Would vote for such
changes 17.0 7.4
1
13.5 10.9 13.5 25.5 21.3
Would vote against such
changes 51.1 34.0 63.0 66.7 50.1 43.1 49.1
Do not know yet 22.9 43.3 17.8 18.9 29.6 22.9 20.3
Would not take part in
the referendum 8.1 8.7 5.3 3.5 6.8 8.6 8.8
NA 0.9 6.6 0.4 0 0 0.1 0.5
Table 3.5. Depending on type of settlement
Variant of answer Type of settlement
Capital Regional centers Cities Towns Village
Would vote for such changes 17.0 12.4 11.2 13.7 19.7
Would vote against such changes 51.1 58.8 43.4 52.8 47.7
Do not know yet 22.9 23.7 29.0 24.7 26.2
Would not take part in the referen-
dum
8.1 5.1 10.8 8.6 5.4
NA 0.9 0 5.6 0.2 1.0
4. Distribution of answers to the question: "Do you know a candidate who could successfully compete
with A. Lukashenko at the next presidential election?"
Table 4.1. Depending on age
Variant of answer All Age, years old
respondents 18-19 20-24 25-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60+up
Yes, I know such
candidate 15.8 26.1 18.7 22.3 21.4 18.4 14.3 4.9
No, I do not know
such candidate 82.1 73.9 79.4 74.1 76.4 78.2 83.2 94.5
NA 2.1 0 1.9 3.6 2.2 3.4 2.5 0.6
Table 4.2. Depending on education
Education
Variant of answer Elementary Incomplete
secondary
Secondary Secondary
vocational
Higher
(incomplete higher)
Yes, I know such
candidate 3.0 9.1 17.5 18.1 25.1
No, I do not know
such candidate 97.0 88.8 80.4 79.8 71.2
NA 0 2.1 2.1 2.1 3.7
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Table 4.3. Depending on status
Status
Variant of answer Employees of the
private sector
Employees of
the public sector
Students Pensioners Unemployed,
housewives
Yes, I know such
candidate 27.7 17.7 27.4 5.1 11.3
No, I do not know
such candidate 71.1 79.1 71.5 94.1 86.4
NA 1.2 3.2 1.1 0.8 2.3
Table 4.4. Depending on place of living
Area
Variant of answer Minsk Minsk
region
Brest and
region
Grodno
and region
Vitebsk and
region
Mogilev and
region
Gomel and
region
Yes, I know such
candidate 16.3 13.5 19.6 19.4 13.2 16.8 12.7
No, I do not know
such candidate 82.0 78.5 79.1 79.6 86.8 82.2 86.5
NA 1.7 8.0 1.3 1.0 0 1.0 0.8
Table 4.5. Depending on type of settlement
Variant of answer Type of settlement
Capital Regional centers Cities Towns Village
Yes, I know such candidate 16.3 13.5 19.6 19.4 13.2
No, I do not know such candidate 82.0 78.5 79.1 79.6 86.8
NA 1.7 8.0 1.3 1.0 0
5.  Distribution of answers to the question: "V. Putin has recently harshly criticized the approaches of
the Belarusian leadership to the integration of Belarus and Russia, and during the latest meeting with
A. Lukashenko in the Kremlin he has offered to choose from two variants: to unite on the principles of
the European Union (each state remains independent, and relies on itself), or Belarus shall become a
part of the Russian Federation (and receive assistance on equal rights with other Russia’s regions).
Which of these variants do you support?"
Table 5.1. Depending on age
Variant of answer All Age, years old
respondents 18-19 20-24 25-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60+up
Integration on EU principles 48.5 55.7 67.4 50.9 50.3 54.5 54.8 30.2
Becoming part of Russia 21.9 17.4 15.5 19.4 23.8 20.1 17.3 28.0
DA/NA 29.6 26.9 17.1 29.7 25.9 25.4 27.9 41.8
Table 5.2. Depending on education
Education
Variant of answer Elementary Incomplete
secondary
Secondary Secondary
vocational
Higher
(incomplete higher)
Integration on EU
principles 24.0 36.0 40.8 54.5 64.4
Becoming part of Russia 21.3 33.1 38.6 20.6 14.7
DA/NA 54.7 30.9 20.6 24.9 20.9
Table 5.3. Depending on status
Status
Variant of answer Employees of
the private sector
Employees of the
public sector
Students Pensioners Unemployed,
housewives
Integration on EU
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principles 61.6 51.9 69.7 31.4 51.7
Becoming part of Russia 18.7 20.6 13.7 27.4 21.1
DA/NA 19.7 27.5 16.6 41.2 27.2
Table 5.4. Depending on place of living
Area
Variant of answer Minsk Minsk
region
Brest and
region
Grodno
and region
Vitebsk
and region
Mogilev
and region
Gomel
and re-
gion
Integration on EU
principles 55.3 35.1 59.5 57.4 35.1 49.7 48.7
Becoming part of Russia 14.8 7.2 27.2 21.1 37.8 31.9 17.9
DA/NA 29.9 57.7 13.3 21.5 27.1 18.4 33.4
Table 5.5. Depending on type of settlement
Variant of answer Type of settlement
Capital Regional centers Cities Towns Village
Integration on EU principles 55.3 50.8 47.9 39.0 49.9
Becoming part of Russia 14.8 33.3 14.6 25.9 19.9
DA/NA 29.9 15.9 37.5 35.1 30.2
6.Distribution of answers to the question: "Russia’s president suggested to hold in spring 2003 a ref-
erendum on the following question: "Do you agree with Russia and Belarus uniting into a single state
on the following principles:
/ ensuring parity of rights and freedoms of citizens of the united state;
b/ parity of the regions of the Russian Federation and Belarus as subjects of the common state;
c/ establishment of common governing bodies in line with the Russian Constitution?"
If there were such a referendum, how would you vote?"
Table 6.1. Depending on age
Variant of answer All Age, years old
respondents 18-19 20-24 25-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60+up
I would say I agree 32.3 32.0 25.9 26.9 29.5 29.6 29.0 42.9
I would say I disagree 26.3 26.9 36.7 26.9 30.8 28.6 25.9 16.9
Do not know yet 31.7 31.5 27.5 37.3 32.0 30.0 35.2 30.8
Would not take part 8.0 9.6 8.7 6.7 5.7 8.9 8.1 6.4
NA 1.7 0 1.2 2.2 2.0 2.9 1.8 3.0
Table 6.2. Depending on education
Education
Variant of answer Elementary Incomplete
secondary
Secondary Secondary
vocational
Higher
(incomplete higher)
I would say I agree 38.5 43.0 29.0 31.7 26.3
I would say I disagree 15.4 20.0 28.7 28.9 31.2
Do not know yet 29.7 28.0 34.0 29.2 35.4
Would not take part 10.9 8.7 7.0 8.9 5.9
NA 5.5 0.3 1.3 1.3 1.2
Table 6.3. Depending on status
Status
Variant of answer Employees of
the private sector
Employees of the
public sector
Students Pensioners Unemployed,
housewives
I would say I agree 29.8 1.5 27.1 42.2 22.5
I would say I disagree 30.8 28.9 38.3 16.6 37.6
Do not know yet 29.4 28.2 26.0 30.0 29.6
Would not take part 10.1 34.5 7.6 8.4 9.1
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NA 0.4 6.9 1.0 2.8 1.2
Table 6.4. Depending on place of living
Area
Variant of answer Minsk Minsk
region
Brest and
region
Grodno
and region
Vitebsk
and region
Mogilev and
region
Gomel and
region
I would say I agree 23.8 32.0 47.3 26.1 43.3 34.0 21.3
I would say I disagree 30.3 28.4 24.0 33.8 13.3 28.2 26.4
Do not know yet 32.8 23.0 20.9 36.2 34.6 33.7 42.3
Would not take part 12.4 6.8 7.8 3.9 8.8 4.1 10.0
NA 0.8 9.8 0 0 0 0 0
Table 6.5. Depending on type of settlement
Variant of answer Type of settlement
Capital Regional centers Cities Towns Village
I would say I agree 23.8 36.4 19.2 38.7 36.7
I would say I disagree 30.2 28.5 26.4 26.9 22.4
Do not know yet 32.8 30.4 42.9 22.6 32.5
Would not take part 12.4 4.7 4.7 11.7 6.7
NA 0.8 0 6.8 0.1 1.7
7. Distribution of answers to the question: "If as a result of the referendum Belarus becomes a part of
the Russian Federation, how most probably would you act?" (answers of those who chose options
"agree" and "would not take part" to the previous question)
Table 7.1. Depending on age
Variant of answer All Age, years old
respondents 18-19 20-24 25-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60+up
I would accept it 29.5 25.5 29.0 26.2 29.2 29.7 35.1 28.8
I would take part in protest actions 7.9 12.5 17.1 7.8 8.7 8.9 7.9 2.5
I would move to a different country 2.4 4.8 4.1 5.3 3.0 2.4 0.8 0.4
I would be ready to stand up for
Belarus’ independence with arms 2.1 1.4 2.7 0.9 3.2 2.8 2.2 0.8
DA 11.2 13.7 9.9 9.3 10.9 11.5 10.6 12.2
Table 7.2. Depending on education
Education
Variant of answer Elementary Incomplete
secondary
Secondary Secondary
vocational
Higher
(incomplete
higher)
I would accept it 27.6 31.7 27.4 30.8 32.3
I would take part in protest actions 2.5 4.0 9.7 9.1 9.9
I would move to a different country 0 0.7 3.4 3.9 1.0
I would be ready to stand up for
Belarus’ independence with arms 0 2.2 2.4 2.8 1.6
DA 17.4 9.9 10.6 9.3 11.6
Table 7.3. Depending on status
Status
Variant of answer Employees of
the private
sector
Employees of
the public
sector
Students Pensioners Unemployed,
housewives
I would accept it 25.2 30.8 25.6 28.7 36.9
I would take part in protest actions 9.5 9.3 17.5 2.9 8.6
I would move to a different country 4.6 2.3 5.2 0.2 5.4
I would be ready to stand up for
Belarus’ independence with arms 3.7 2.2 2.5 1.3 0.9
DA 12.0 10.1 12.1 13.6 3.9
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Table 7.4. Depending on place of living
Area
Variant of answer Minsk Minsk
region
Brest and
region
Grodno
and region
Vitebsk
and region
Mogilev and
region
Gomel and
region
I would accept it 34.3 32.3 23.9 29.1 37.5 30.5 19.3
I would take part in
protest actions 12.0 8.0 12.0 12.4 1.6 4.1 4.9
I would move to a
different country
2.6 2.9 1.3 1.0 2.1 3.7 2.8
I would be ready to stand
up for Belarus’
independence with arms 3.2 3.7 0 1.3 0.4 1.1 4.1
DA 14.8 14.1 8.4 10.1 4.5 6.1 17.7
Table 7.5. Depending on type of settlement
Variant of answer Type of settlement
Capital Regional centers Cities Towns Village
I would accept it 34.3 27.6 35.5 30.2 24.7
I would take part in protest actions 12.0 10.1 11.0 7.1 3.5
I would move to a different country 2.6 2.4 3.7 1.8 1.9
I would be ready to stand up for
Belarus’ independence with arms 3.2 3.2 3.0 0.3 1.5
DA 14.8 7.1 14.1 11.8 9.7
8. Distribution of answers to the question: "If there were an election to the Union Parliament, would
you take part in it?"
Table 8.1. Depending on age
Variant of answer All Age, years old
respondents 18-19 20-24 25-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60+up
Yes 60.9 58.9 61.9 56.8 61.1 58.3 66.7 61.1
No 17.3 19.9 25.6 20.0 17.2 18.0 21.6 17.2
DA/NA 21.8 21.2 12.5 23.2 21.7 23.7 20.7 21.7
Table 8.2. Depending on education
Education
Variant of answer Elementary Incomplete
secondary
Secondary Secondary
vocational
Higher
(incomplete higher)
Yes 49.2 62.7 60.3 62.5 68.0
No 12.9 18.1 17.7 20.1 14.7
DA/NA 37.9 19.3 22.0 17.4 17.3
Table 8.3. Depending on status
Status
Variant of answer Employees of
the private sector
Employees of
the public sector
Students Pensioners Unemployed,
housewives
Yes 63.8 59.4 65.0 61.0 62.6
No 21.4 18.3 17.8 12.4 21.2
DA/NA 14.8 22.3 17.2 26.6 16.2
Table 8.4. Depending on place of living
Area
Variant of answer Minsk Minsk
region
Brest and
region
Grodno
and region
Vitebsk
and region
Mogilev and
region
Gomel and
region
Yes 50.8 56.6 72.7 62.3 63.3 60.0 62.4
No 24.2 13.6 17.8 12.6 19.2 18.6 14.0
DA/NA 25.0 29.8 9.5 25.1 17.5 21.4 23.6
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Table 8.5. Depending on type of settlement
Variant of answer Type of settlement
Capital Regional centers Cities Towns Village
Yes 50.8 70.3 52.9 65.2 62.1
No 24.2 12.0 16.7 18.1 16.4
DA/NA 25.0 17.7 30.4 16.7 21.5
9. Distribution of answers to the question: "What is your attitude towards the abolition of the Constitu-
tional norm banning A. Lukashenko from being elected for the third consecutive term, and Russian
capital taking part in privatization of Belarusian enterprises?"
Table 9.1. Depending on age
Variant of answer All Age, years old
respondents 18-19 20-24 25-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60+up
Positive 23.7 18.1 11.1 12.2 18.7 15.4 27.6 42.0
Negative 58.0 72.5 78.6 77.0 66.5 63.6 55.1 31.5
DA/NA 18.3 9.4 10.4 10.8 14.8 21.0 17.3 26.5
Table 9.2. Depending on education
Education
Variant of answer Elementary Incomplete
secondary
Secondary Secondary
vocational
Higher
(incomplete higher)
Positive 37.6 41.0 21.2 16.3 13.7
Negative 27.0 38.1 61.8 69.3 75.7
DA/NA 35.4 20.9 17.0 14.4 10.6
Table 9.3. Depending on status
Status
Variant of answer Employees of
the private sector
Employees of
the public sector
Students Pensioners Unemployed,
housewives
Positive 13.8 18.8 13.9 41.2 10.0
Negative 72.7 65.1 75.3 33.4 70.4
DA/NA 13.5 15.1 10.8 25.4 19.6
Table 9.4. Depending on place of living
Area
Variant of answer Minsk Minsk
region
Brest
and region
Grodno and
region
Vitebsk
and re-
gion
Mogilev and
region
Gomel and
region
Positive 23.8 25.8 18.1 11.5 23.5 34.4 28.3
Negative 58.7 37.8 64.3 74.7 60.6 52.6 60.7
DA/NA 17.5 36.4 17.6 13.8 15.9 13.0 11.0
Table 9.5. Depending on type of settlement
Variant of answer Type of settlement
Capital Regional centers Cities Towns Village
Positive 23.8 17.1 19.3 23.6 29.7
Negative 58.7 71.1 49.3 57.4 54.7
DA/NA 17.5 11.8 31.4 19.0 15.6
10.  Distribution of answers to the question: "The Chamber of Representatives has recently adopted the
new edition of the law approving «the leading role of the Orthodox Church» in our country. Some peo-
ple support it believing this is fair because the majority of Belarusian believers are Orthodox believers.
Others speak out against it saying the law infringes upon the rights of other religions. What do you
think about it?"
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Table 10.1. Depending on age
Variant of answer All Age, years old
respondents 18-19 20-24 25-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60+up
Orthodox Church shall be
superior to other religions 33.6 22.9 27.6 20.6 30.0 34.8 37.3 42.3
All churches shall enjoy equal
rights 57.7 74.2 63.6 67.8 61.5 56.8 54.5 48.3
DA/NA 8.7 2.9 8.8 11.6 8.5 8.4 8.2 9.4
Table 10.2. Depending on education
Education
Variant of answer Elementary Incomplete
secondary
Secondary Secondary
vocational
Higher
(incomplete higher)
Orthodox Church shall be
superior to other religions 37.1 40.1 33.0 33.4 26.2
All churches shall enjoy equal
rights 50.6 52.0 59.1 55.9 68.3
DA/NA 12.3 7.9 7.9 10.7 5.5
Table 10.3. Depending on status
Status
Variant of answer Employees of
the private
sector
Employees of
the public
sector
Students Pensioners Unemployed,
housewives
Orthodox Church shall be
superior to other religions 28.1 30.6 33.6 41.0 36.9
All churches shall enjoy
equal rights 64.9 59.6 58.9 49.5 60.8
DA/NA 7.0 9.8 7.5 9.5 2.3
Table 10.4. Depending on place of living
Area
Variant of answer Minsk Minsk
region
Brest and
region
Grodno
and region
Vitebsk
and region
Mogilev and
region
Gomel and
region
Orthodox Church shall
be superior to other
religions 28.9 35.0 59.1 18.6 18.7 34.3 36.9
All churches shall enjoy
equal rights 56.8 51.1 34.9 77.1 74.9 61.2 53.9
DA/NA 13.3 13.9 6.0 4.3 6.4 4.5 9.2
Table 10.5. Depending on type of settlement
Variant of answer Type of settlement
Capital Regional centers Cities Towns Village
Orthodox Church shall be superior
to other religions 28.9 36.7 26.4 27.8 41.4
All churches shall enjoy equal rights 56.8 58.8 57.2 66.9 51.6
DA/NA 13.3 4.5 16.4 5.3 7.0
11.  Distribution of answers to the question: "Are you going to take part in the elections to local
Councils?"
Table 11.1. Depending on age
Variant of answer All Age, years old
respondents 18-19 20-24 25-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60+up
Yes 60.3 52.6 57.6 56.3 57.7 60.0 68.9 64.5
No 20.3 22.6 23.4 7.4 21.2 22.8 16.4 15.8
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DA/NA 19.3 24.6 19.0 16.3 21.1 17.2 14.7 19.7
Table 11.2. Depending on education
Education
Variant of answer Elementary Incomplete
secondary
Secondary Secondary
vocational
Higher
(incomplete higher)
Yes 54.5 60.3 58.2 59.1 71.5
No 21.3 20.8 20.9 22.1 14.8
DA/NA 24.2 18.9 20.8 18.8 13.7
Table 11.3. Depending on status
Status
Variant of answer Employees of
the private sector
Employees of
the public sector
Students Pensioners Unemployed,
housewives
Yes 52.4 61.0 60.5 64.2 54.7
No 27.9 19.5 22.5 15.7 28.3
DA/NA 19.7 19.5 17.0 20.1 17.0
Table 11.4. Depending on place of living
Area
Variant of answer Minsk Minsk
region
Brest
and region
Grodno and
region
Vitebsk
and re-
gion
Mogilev and
region
Gomel
and region
Yes 54.1 62.6 71.1 70.2 49.0 50.4 64.6
No 21.9 14.7 18.1 14.5 27.3 27.8 18.9
DA/NA 24.0 22.7 10.8 15.3 23.7 21.8 16.5
Table 11.5. Depending on type of settlement
Variant of answer Type of settlement
Capital Regional centers Cities Towns Village
Yes 54.1 67.5 63.5 56.0 60.6
No 21.9 16.2 15.6 25.1 20.6
DA/NA 24.0 16.3 20.9 18.9 18.8
12.  Distribution of answers to the question: " If you are going to support a candidate of one of the
parties, which in particular? " (only one answer is possible)
Table 12.1. Depending on age
Variant of answer All Age, years old
respondents 18-19 20-24 25-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60+up
United Civic Party 3.6 3.0 4.4 3.1 4.3 5.5 4.3 1.3
BPF Adradzhennye 3.1 9.5 10.3 2.2 3.3 2.3 0.5 1.6
Conservative-Christian Party of
BPF 2.9 7.5 1.7 5.2 2.8 3.8 2.5 1.4
BSDP Narodnaya Gramada 2.7 2.7 1.6 1.5 5.2 2.4 2.0 2.0
Labor Party 1.6 1.4 1.6 0.6 0.9 2.1 1.7 2.2
Women’s Party Nadzeya 6.9 4.3 7.5 7.3 7.7 7.7 4.1 7.3
Belarusian Party of Commu-
nists
3.3 1.4 1.4 2.2 1.1 3.7 3.2 6.0
Liberal-Democratic Party 7.6 7.6 10.5 13.6 11.6 8.0 5.0 2.1
BSDG 2.9 4.6 2.4 5.7 1.3 4.1 4.3 1.6
Other party 2.9 1.5 3.1 2.4 3.3 2.2 5.0 2.3
DA/NA 62.5 56.5 55.5 56.2 58.5 58.1 67.4 72.2
Table 12.2. Depending on education
Education
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Variant of answer Elementary Incomplete
secondary
Secondary Secondary
vocational
Higher
(incomplete higher)
United Civic Party 1.2 2.4 3.7 3.3 7.2
BPF Adradzhennye 1.5 1.1 3.2 4.6 3.9
Conservative-Christian Party of
BPF
0 2.5 3.7 4.6 1.4
BSDP Narodnaya Gramada 1.3 1.0 3.3 2.6 3.8
Labor Party 2.6 2.1 1.4 1.7 1.0
Women’s Party Nadzeya 4.5 6.8 7.8 7.0 6.9
Belarusian Party of Communists 5.5 3.6 2.7 2.0 4.2
Liberal-Democratic Party 1.3 5.4 7.8 9.9 11.0
BSDG 1.2 2.5 2.0 2.6 7.9
Other party 1.2 2.3 3.6 3.7 1.7
DA/NA 79.7 70.3 60.8 58.0 51.0
Table 12.3. Depending on status
Status
Variant of answer Employees of
the private sector
Employees of
the public sector
Students Pensioners Unemployed,
housewives
United Civic Party 4.9 4.7 4.2 1.4 1.8
BPF Adradzhennye 3.4 2.9 14.3 1.4 1.1
Conservative-Christian Party
of BPF 3.1 3.2 3.1 1.6 5.8
BSDP Narodnaya Gramada 3.9 2.4 2.1 2.1 5.3
Labor Party 1.2 1.5 1.0 2.4 0.9
Women’s Party Nadzeya 6.0 7.8 6.1 6.5 5.8
Belarusian Party of
Communists 2.0 3.1 0 4.6 5.1
Liberal-Democratic Party 13.7 7.9 14.3 2.4 7.5
BSDG 4.0 3.0 3.3 2.4 1.7
Other party 4.0 3.1 2.1 2.4 1.3
DA/NA 53.8 60.5 49.5 72.8 63.7
Table 12.4. Depending on place of living
Area
Variant of answer Minsk Minsk
region
Brest and
region
Grodno
and region
Vitebsk
and region
Mogilev
and region
Gomel and
region
United Civic Party 4.8 2.0 1.8 8.2 2.1 3.2 4.0
BPF Adradzhennye 2.5 0.8 8.4 2.6 4.3 1.4 1.9
Conservative-Christian
Party of BPF 6.1 2.5 1.2 6.8 1.0 1.3 1.7
BSDP Narodnaya
Gramada 2.1 1.8 0.7 2.3 3.6 4.2 4.1
Labor Party 2.2 0.7 1.6 0.8 0 2.4 3.5
Women’s Party Nadzeya 6.7 4.4 5.2 6.7 5.3 8.7 11.6
Belarusian Party of
Communists 2.4 6.7 5.4 2.0 1.3 1.8 2.2
Liberal-Democratic Party 4.4 6.1 13.7 6.9 4.2 9.7 9.2
BSDG 4.2 4.9 0.9 5.4 0.6 2.0 2.5
Other party 1.6 3.3 3.1 5.0 3.5 0.9 2.9
DA/NA 63.0 66.8 63.0 53.3 74.1 64.3 56.4
Table 12.5. Depending on type of settlement
Variant of answer Type of settlement
Capital Regional centers Cities Towns Village
United Civic Party 4.8 2.4 2.6 5.9 2.8
BPF Adradzhennye 2.5 5.4 1.3 1.9 3.9
Conservative-Christian Party of BPF 6.1 1.5 2.2 2.1 3.0
BSDP Narodnaya Gramada 2.1 4.6 0.8 0.5 4.1
Labor Party 2.2 1.9 1.1 2.0 1.2
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Women’s Party Nadzeya 6.7 6.5 4.5 3.6 10.6
Belarusian Party of Communists 2.4 2.3 3.9 4.3 3.2
Liberal-Democratic Party 4.4 6.9 6.0 7.4 8.4
BSDG 4.2 5.4 3.9 2.2 3.1
Other party 1.6 2.1 4.6 0.9 4.5
DA/NA 63.0 61.0 69.1 69.2 55.2
Trends of change in Belarusian public opinion
about some socio-economic and political problems
(based on results of IISEPS’s national opinion polls, %)
Table 1. Structure of aggregated indicator of attitude towards A. Lukashenko
Indexes of attitude Mentioned . Lukashenko (Option ) Did not mention . Lukashenko (Option )
11'97 09'98 11'99 11'00 10'01 04'02 09'02 11'97 09'98 11'99 11'00 10'01 04'02 09'02
Would vote for
A. Lukashenko at a
new presidential elec-
tion 44.3 52.2 43.8 38.2 46.0 30.9 27.0 55.7 47.8 56.2 61.8 54.0 69.1 73.0
Would vote for
A. Lukashenko at an
election of Russia-
Belarus president 35.2 44.7 31.6 27.5 26.4 14.0 15.0 64.8 55.3 68.4 72.5 73.6 86.0 85.0
Trust the president 45.0 48.0 39.8 36.0 44.5 32.4 36.1 22.51 22.11 32.51 37.61 39.51 50.11 44.21
Consider
A. Lukashenko an ideal 50.4 51.5 44.9 37.5 36.8 26.0 23.2 49.6 48.5 55.1 62.5 63.2 74.0 76.8
Table 2. Dynamics of electoral types
Electoral types 11'97 09'98 11'99 11'00 10'01 04'02 09'02
Convinced supporters of A. Lukashenko
(chose option A while answering all four
questions) 26.0 29.3 22.3 18.5 20.2 10.4 10.7
Vacillatory 53.2 53.3 49.5 49.1 43.9 42.7 48.0
Convinced opponents of A. Lukashenko
(chose option B while answering all four
questions) 20.8 17.4 28.2 32.5 35.9 46.9 41.3
Table 3. Confidence in mass media
Variant of answer 11'97 09'98 11'99 11'00 10'01 04'02 09'02
State-run mass media
– trust
– distrust
43.7
21.0
41.8
26.0
32.2
34.7
34.3
36.0
40.4
42.4
38.7
43.1
34.6
45.2
Non-state mass media
– trust
– distrust
25.4
24.1
19.6
32.6
34.4
26.1
23.7
35.9
31.9
42.1
32.2
43.9
32.2
40.8
Table 4. The most attractive, corresponding to an ideal politicians
Politician1 11'97 09'98 11'99 11'00 10'01 04'02 09'02
V. Putin –2 –2 –2 51.8 65.2 68.1 66.9
. Lukashenko 50.4 51.5 44.9 37.5 36.8 26.0 23.2
G. Schroeder –2 –2 16.0 9.1 12.6 14.3 13.2
G. W. Bush Jr –2 –2 –2 –2 7.7 8.5 8.5
F. Castro 8.3 10.8 14.7 9.7 9.4 7.9 9.5
J. Chirac 9.5 9.9 –2 11.3 8.6 9.3 9.4
T. Blair –2 2.3 6.7 6.8 8.0 10.2 8.8
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A. Kwasneiwski 2.9 5.3 7.9 5.8 4.6 7.4 5.6
V. Havel 3.6 4.7 8.0 4.3 4.3 5.3 3.3
S. Hussein –2 3.8 6.0 3.3 3.2 1.5 3.2
V. Adamkus –2 1.2 7.2 1.9 2.5 4.6 3.1
1
 Other politicians received less than 3% of votes
2
 Names of the given politicians were not offered in the polls indicated
Table 5. Do you think our country develops in the right or a wrong direction?
Variant of answer 10'01 04'02 09'02
In the right direction 36.7 21.4 21.3
In a wrong directions 38.1 55.5 49.1
Table 6. The most pressing problems facing the country and the population
(more than one answer is possible)
Problems 09'98 06'99 11'99 08'00 11'00 09'02
Rise in prices 74.7 82.7 80.2 76.7 81.2 71.9
Impoverishment of the population 49.7 73.2 78.0 68.4 71.4 60.6
Unemployment 28.5 35.7 43.3 36.8 38.9 49.4
Setback in production 23.5 31.8 36.1 31.3 29.3 38.7
Crime 26.7 44.6 41.8 44.2 41.6 35.3
Corruption, bribery 21.8 29.7 37.5 31.4 32.8 27.8
Lack of order, law 20.0 24.6 27.8 28.1 27.7 27.4
Human rights violation 9.9 23.3 28.0 27.5 27.6 25.2
Overcoming the consequences of the Cher-
nobyl catastrophe 20.2 29.5 28.8 23.4 21.6 19.7
International isolation 8.8 9.1 10.2 8.6 8.2 14.4
Threat to Belarus’ independence –1 –1 –1 –1 7.2 10.2
Decay of national culture –1 13.1 14.3 12.2 13.9 10.2
Split of the society –1 5.0 10.2 7.2 7.2 5.2
Threat of the West 2.7 9.3 9.4 5.4 4.9 3.6
1
 the given answer was not offered
Table 7. Are you satisfied with A. Lukashenko’s ruling?
Variant of answer 08'00 11'00 04'01 08'01 09'02
Rather dissatisfied 41.6 36.3 33.8 15.5 36.5
Partially satisfied, partially dissatisfied 40.5 42.9 46.9 40.5 46.9
Rather satisfied 17.6 20.3 18.3 26.5 12.9
Table 8. Change of economic situation in Belarus over the last year
Variant of answer 06'96 06'97 11'99 08'00 11'00 10'01 04'02 09'02
Has improved 8.3 18.7 8.5 5.9 9.7 17.8 7.7 5.9
Has not changed 28.8 30.2 23.9 29.1 38.9 47.4 33.2 37.8
Has deteriorated 61.9 51.0 67.4 63.5 50.9 29.2 55.5 50.0
Table 9. How has your life and the life of your family changed since 1994?
Variant of answer 04'01 08'01 10'01 09'02
Has changed for the better 11.8 18.1 22.8 13.8
Has not changed 27.7 34.6 34.2 33.1
Has changed for the worse 50.7 40.7 38.3 48.5
Table 10. Average income (including wages, pensions and other incomes) for one family members last
month
Variant of answer 04'00 11'00 04'01 10'01 04'02 09'02
Below the living wage budget 68.2 65.8 54.2 44.9 49.9 49.5
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From the living wage budget to
the minimum consumer budget 20.6 22.1 32.3 34.7 31.1 32.7
From the minimum consumer
budget to $100 7.4 9.3 10.8 14.0 14.8 12.2
From $100 and up 1.8 1.6 1.8 5.8 4.2 5.6
Table 11. Would you wish your children do private business, engage in private enterprise?
Variant of answer 11'99 04'00 08'00 09'02
Yes 38.1 39.9 40.6 52.0
No 26.0 24.9 24.5 28.1
Table 12. Would you like to emigrate to a different country?
Variant of answer 11'99 06'00 11'00 10'01 04'02 09'02
Would not like moving anywhere 61.2 68.5 60.1 52.0 50.3 54.6
Germany 15.2 9.3 14.1 18.5 16.5 13.3
United States 11.5 9.8 11.1 6.1 9.4 8.6
Poland 3.9 1.7 3.1 5.8 4.6 5.7
Russia 1.3 2.6 3.2 3.6 4.9 4.3
Baltic States 1.8 0.9 1.3 1.8 1.8 1.7
Other country 4.7 6.2 7.1 6.3 4.2 4.7
Table 13. Language of everyday use
Variant of answer 06'95 11'97 09'98 11'99 11'00 10'01 04'02 09'02
Belarusian 4.5 5.7 2.9 4.1 4.2 1.7 2.6 5.4
Russian 37.3 40.6 39.2 39.0 37.6 46.3 46.3 44.2
Both Russian and Belarusian 7.8 20.3 22.7 23.1 25.7 20.9 19.9 21.2
Mixed 50.0 32.5 33.6 33.3 31.3 30.0 31.1 25.4
Other 0.4 0.8 0.5 0.2 0.7 0.1 0.1 0.2
O P E N  F O R U M
END TO STAGING AND BEGINNING OF INTEGRATION?
Alexander Fadeyev, Doctor of Historical Science, Professor
V. Putin’s well-known September address, as we see it, proved rather unexpected for the
Belarusian leadership and caused certain confusion. On the whole, A. Lukashenko reacted
negatively at the document, he could not hide his painful irritation and dissatisfaction with Russia’s
proposals, which he called "abnormal". But, as we see it, this definition the Belarus president applied
only to two variants of the integration offered by Moscow: the incorporation of Belarus (and its
regions) into the Russian Federation and the unification by the EU model. In any case, there are
reasons to say that the next round of Belarus-Russia relations began with complications; the tension
in the dialog of the two leaders has not been overcome, but heightened.
A. Lukashenko persistently declares the thesis about the invariability of Minsk’s course for
fulfillment of the 1999 treaty on creation of the Union State "without changes". The Kremlin,
however, quite fairly detected in the draft Constitutional Act of the Union State submitted by the
Belarusian side a clear and threatening deviation from the spirit and the letter of the given
intergovernmental document in the form of approval of an unconditional right to secession. Aside
from that, when two years later politicians, public figures, organizations and mass media refer to the
topic of the Russia-Belarus integration trying to gain an understanding of who and what impedes the
establishment of the Union State, a common economic space, an election to the Union Parliament,
39
etc., they have always forgotten the main thing. The matter is that two years after the 1999 treaty
was signed it has not come into force. The reason is that Article 61 of the document, which reads
that the treaty takes effect only after "fulfillment of all necessary domestic procedures to change the
Constitutions of each member-state". Neither Russia, nor Belarus have introduced amendments to
their national Constitutions to "find proper place" for the Union State.
Moreover, in August Moscow for the first time publicly declared what has already been clear for
Russian experts – the unification with Belarus is possible only without changing the Constitution of
the Russian Federation. In such path of the reunification Belarus’ interests and its statehood are
considered as secondary, of little importance.
The Kremlin, of course, was irritated with constant and persistent requests from the side of the
Belarus Presidential Administration to grant new credits, privileges and preferences. But the fatal
mistake of the Belarusian president in the framework of the dialog with Moscow, in our opinion, was
the simultaneous "promotion" of the problem of the national budget losing huge revenues (the figure
of $200m a year was cited) as a result of the Russian government’s intrigues. Another figure of
Russia’s indebtedness to Belarus – $1 billion – was also referred to. The declared claims for a
special status of the republic in trade-economic relations with Russia aggravated the situation. The
issue of Belarus’ state debt could shortly go beyond the framework of bilateral relations demanding
arbitration from the side of international institutions, and imposing certain political limits on Belarus
(aside from economic sanctions). So far the Belarusian political elite has not bothered to choose a
possible strategy to manage the structure of state debt – minimization of expenses or the principle of
minimizing risks. Having proclaimed the idea of "a social state", the Belarus government tried to
uphold a third model in the policy of foreign borrowing (the "zero variant", etc.), which seems
unacceptable for its creditors, and first of fall or Russia.
Obviously, at present attractiveness of an economic rapprochement with Belarus to a great
degree is lost for Russia. However, Russia is still interested in the development of the air defense
system in the western direction using the potential of the Belarusian side. Nonetheless, the
Belarusian leadership has so far expressed no intention of strengthening and developing the
partnership in the military field. The Belarus president in every way declines signing with the Russian
side a prepared and approved a couple of years ago agreement on creation of a joint air defense
system. How could Russia’s state-political leadership, Defense Minister S. Ivanov, whose two visits
to Minsk failed, react at this situation? Th answer is obvious.
Moscow was bewildered by the attempt of the Belarusian head of state to rehabilitate the policy
and traditions of the relations between Russian and Belarusian power elites of the B. Yeltsin era.
That is simply impossible: the era of staging pompous state acts paying no attention to Russia’s
national, financial-economic interests and foreign relations consequences, discredited itself and is
gone, and there is no point in speculating on the issue. No populist models of the integration of
Russia and Belarus, if they are not justified in terms of finance, military-strategic or practical state
interests, would be accepted by the present Russian leadership. Thus, A. Lukashenko’s efforts – in
the spirit of Sibylla’s prophecy – to mention what has already happened in the future time are in
vain.
In mid September the contradictions between the Russian and the Belarusian sides on the
problem of unification of the two countries became more acute. The Union Council of Ministers failed
to answer two major questions expected to be solved at its session on September 17–18: what are
the prospects of the draft Constitutional Act of the Union State and the future of an accelerated
variant to introduce the union currency in the form of the Russian ruble. M. Kasyanov and Belarusian
Premier G. Novitsky preferred not to consider the first document having no intention of intensifying
the present political conflict of the two presidents, who have so far failed to find common grounds
regarding models of the integration. As for moving the deadline of Belarus’ adoption of the Russian
ruble starting January 1, 2004, no understanding was found. The Belarusian delegation rejected the
proposal of their Russian colleagues to make the Russian Central Bank the common emission
center (what would have been logical, since the adoption of the Russian ruble, not Belarusian ruble,
is suggested). As a result, a new working group to "work out the issue in detail" was set up. It is
expected to formulate recommendations to the national governments by December this year.
What causes great concern is not just the cancellation of the June session of the Union Council
of Ministers in the context of transition of Belarus and Russia to the single currency – the Russian
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ruble, but the fact that the Belarusian side is not ready to discuss the problem of the single currency
of the Union State as such at any moment. Such approach reveals Minsk’s clear aspirations to
assume no responsibility on plausible pretexts in terms of fulfilling the previously signed agreement
on transition to the single currency by 2008. Russia’s president reacted promptly. At a special press
conference for the mass media of the Krasnodarsky Krai in Sochi V. Putin emphasized that there
was no point in discussing the concept of several emission centers empowered to print the Russian
ruble, brought to Moscow by the Belarusian delegation: there could only be one emission center – in
Moscow. In this respect – as V. Putin put it – today the question is "whether we want the ruble to be
the single currency, or not!"
Moreover, the head of the Russian state "corrected" his own proposal of August 14 about the
desirable accession of the Belarusian regions to the Russian Federation as its subjects and on the
basis of the Russian Constitutions. This time he suggests the whole Belarus becoming part of
Russia in line with the Russian Constitution (!). Strangely enough, V. Putin believes that such
categorical declarations do not aggravate the situation, do not drive the relations with the Belarusian
authorities into a deadlock by such rigid stance. To be objective, it is hard to accept such "partner-
like, comradely" approach, which, from the point of view of the Russian president, allows only a
discussion on certain moments, details (and that’s it). The Belarus president, of course, does not
agree with V. Putin’s plan. And several hours later at the September 17 press conference in Minsk
he says about it in a peculiar way. According to him, God determined the place of Belarus in Europe,
in the common house… Belarus is ready for any unions, any agreements only (here A. Lukashenko
made a stress) on equal conditions, the Belarusian leadership would not allow to "deceive" itself in
terms of a currency union with Russia, to make Belarus dependent on foreign currency, including the
Russian ruble, because that would mean an end of its sovereignty. M. Kasyanov’s public address to
A. Lukashenko to react at V. Putin’s initiative about the accelerated introduction of the single
currency starting January 1, 2004, only angered the Belarusian president (as he put it).
We shall not omit another important aspect. On the eve of the president’s press conference
through all available information channels the Belarusian Presidential Administration persistently
tried to draw wide public attention to the event presented as a special, an epochal one. Meanwhile,
during the meeting of A. Lukashenko with representatives of mass media in the Palace of the
Republic and answers to questions by Belarusian citizens we heard no revelations or novations from
his side in the sphere of politics, economics or any other sphere. Speaking a plain language
Alexander Grigoryevich [Lukashenko] once again stated the well known position of the republican
"cabinet" on the issues of domestic and foreign policy. Mass media leaders, journalists were, of
course, gathered for other reasons. The whole event was organized, first of all, to publicly declare
A. Lukashenko’s claims for the third presidential term by the formula: referendum – changing the
Constitution – election. Why four years before the completion of A. Lukashenko’s presidency the
Belarusians authorities decided to make public the plan of prolonging the powers of the head of
state, which – according to the Belarusian Constitution – run out in September 2006? In our opinion,
that is an unambiguous reply of A. Lukashenko to V. Putin’s address, a mirror-like response to the
formula offered to the Belarusian side by Russia’s president: referendum in Belarus and Russia –
common Parliament of the Union State – common Union Government – common president of the
Union State.
Thus, Belarus President A. Lukashenko not only rejected the initiative of the Russian president,
but also added to his actions the well known ideological, program appearance, for which he has
always had a bent. His statements were accompanied, for example, by arguments of an inevitable
union between Russians and Belarusians in the future ("not under Lukashenko, Putin"), which,
probably, is to guard the ruling Belarusian elite from potential accusations from the side of Russia of
defection and betrayal of ideals of the Belarus-Russia Union, an obvious rebellious character. For
that purpose Minsk presented the idea of creating the Union State as a model of equal interstate
formation realized in sustainable, and what is of great importance, objectively reproduced forms of
little dependence on the will of the present leaders of Russia and Belarus. Meanwhile, the practice
of bilateral relations between the two countries over the recent years proves the opposite – there is
no integration without agreements on the "top", consent of the two presidents. On the whole, coming
back to the ideologamme of A. Lukashenko, we shall consider other of its aspects – the supposed
availability of all social categories of the Union State to direct administrative influence, as well as a
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long period for final resolution of all arising questions, first of all, resolution of the problem of powers
for national elites.
At the same time considering A. Lukashenko’s statement that Belarus would never initiate the
destruction of the Union (that is what the Kremlin allegedly strives for) only as a method of political
demagogy seems unreasonable. The Belarusian president and his entourage, probably, are ready to
be loyal to the Russian leadership, but are unable to take in the evident threat to their political
present and future, considering V. Putin’s address and other of his integration statements as a
manifestation of Moscow’s plot, a dangerous precedent of attempt at their powers, and finally
undermining its economic might. Shall we be surprised at the painful reaction by the Belarusian elite,
because Russia’s initiatives took it unawares, and there was no time for the republican leadership to
carefully plan reasonable countermeasures.
From our point of view, any concept of the unification of the two countries objectively
presupposes restructuring of the top echelon of state officials, first of all in Belarus. But that does
not mean an automatic liquidation of this "caste", which, as we understand from V. Putin’s silence on
the issue, is deprived of the right to play a role in governing the Union State. Anyway, this problem
has no simple solution and demands not so much political courage, as a balanced approached,
eradication of the "paternalist" attitude to the Belarus ruling class from the side of Russia. In many
respects Belarusian top officials still perceive political reality symbolically, but today neither Russia’s
president, nor the Russian premier show them demonstrative signs of trust thereby depriving
representatives of the ruling Belarusian elite of hopes for representation in the framework of the
Union State.
In many respects the Moscow and Sochi initiatives of the Russian president do not take into
account the specific character of philosophy and methods of functioning of the Belarusian state
machine. Meanwhile, for the eleven years of Belarus’ independence the corporation of Belarusian
top managers has managed to consolidate in public consciousness the leading idea regarding its
eastern neighbor: the main thing in this respect – differences, not similarities. Moreover, the practical
activity of the Belarusian state machine is based on its opposition to Russia’s visions of the state
and its economy, Russian methodology of governing. And the Belarusian model of state is depicted
as an ideal one, and Russia’s state and social-economic structure – as a mistaken one leading to
chaos and disintegration of the Federation. Contemporary ideology of the ruling class, as we know,
opposes the Belarusian mode of life and those features of Russia, which made Europe and the
world to respect and admire it for centuries: faithfulness of Russians to their loyal duty and financial
obligations, valor of the Russian army, courage and bravery of its warriors, belief in great destination
of their Motherland.
Minsk politicians prefer not to think about the fact that small countries, and Belarus is considered
a small country, have objectively never been and are unable to be independent in their policy – they
are only relatively independent. Aside from that, in the framework of integration the republican
bureaucracy, the peculiar party of power is concerned about the possibility of changing of its present
condition when, in fact, no one accounts for himself and his undertakings, and the bureaucratic
corporation covers officials, protects its might with solidarity and carefully conceals sins and flaws of
its members.
Therefore, the idea about Belarus’ accession to the Russian Federation as a subject (on the basis
of the Russian Constitution) certainly seems unacceptable to the ruling class of the republic. In this
case, shall V. Putin repeatedly state the unacceptable variant of the integration with Belarus? Most
probably this is the deadlock on the way of the reunion of Belarus and Russia against which the
Russian president warned in Sochi.
Since this past summer Belarus has entered the period of serious ordeals, which is to be
accompanied not only by a more active policy of maneuvering between the leading world powers
and groups of states, but also search for a foreign policy counterbalance to the Kremlin increasing
its pressure and trying to build its relations with Minsk based on its own vision of the integration
priorities. Most probably, Russia’s leadership will continue pursuing the irredentist course towards
the republic regardless of its obligations under the 1999 Union treaty. We shall emphasize that this
is the determinative moment in the situation around the future of the Union State, and since there
are no supporters of further concessions to President A. Lukashenko in V. Putin’s entourage, the
further scenario of Russia-Belarus relations might follow the path of open categorical declarations
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(although being ritual gestures), accompanied by encouraging actions to support possible
successors of the Belarusian president, including "Russian Belarusians".
On the whole, we shall state that at present the presidents of Russia and Belarus are more
concerned about satisfaction of their power ambitions than the problem of further development of
the unification process. So far there have been no political concept of the reintegration considering
all major interests of the parties, which could be taken seriously. In this respect the role of the
parliaments and the people of Russia and Belarus remains secondary having no influence on the
integration efforts. In addition, the crisis in the relations between the leaders of Russia and Belarus
is more dangerous for A. Lukashenko and his political future: probably, a new head of the republic
will be appointed not in Minsk, but in another place.
B O O K S H E L F
Pavel Severinets. "MALADY FRONT GENERATION.
History of youth born in 1970–1985".
Minsk, 2002., 89 p.
In late September Malady Front leader P. Severinets presented his book "Malady Front
generation. History of youth born in 1970–85." The book, of course, is of great interest both as the
first attempt to analyze the activity of the public organization Malady Front and as a view of its
present leader, who stood at the origins of the organization, on its past and prospects.
The book consists of five parts. The first part is devoted to the period of 1985–1995. It describes
the influence of the break-up of the totalitarian Soviet state, Belarus’ gaining independence,
"perestroika," glasnost, establishment of political parties, etc. upon the formation and making of
youth. During that period public youth organizations were created and youth factions of the political
parties were formed. In 1992 the youth faction of the Belarusian Popular Front Adradzhennye was
established and in several months it originated an independent public youth organization Malady
Front.
Parts 2–4 are devoted to the description of Malady Front’s formation and activity from 1996
through 2000. They narrate in detail the actions of Malady Front by years, and analyze activities of
other Belarusian youth organizations.
Defining the genre of his work, the author emphasizes that this is neither "belles-lettres, nor
chronicles, nor publicism. This is the history." The history, which, in our opinion, is described
somewhat emotionally. And there is nothing to be surprised at, because the author of the book is an
immediate participant and organizer of most described events and actions. That is why the work is
valuable, this is the history from "first hands."
Many ideas of the author are disputable and need additional argumentation. For example, in his
opinion "Belarusization without God – is hollow. Belarusian form, state and national features,
language and culture are destined for a Christian content… The true independence – is when
people believe in God and love Belarus" … "The true Belarusian movement is uniquely Christian in
its essence. It becomes apparent from our sacred symbols – white-red-white flag of Christ, a white
sheet with stains of blood of crucified Jesus, spiritual hymn "Mighty Lord," "Pagonya" and the
advantage of Belarusian spirit over all occupations, wars, empires and dictatorships." Malady Front’s
program is mainly based on a Christian idea, but it is not clear how it affects the concrete activity of
this organization, which, in our opinion, is a strong group of pressure upon absolutely all branches of
power. Sometimes the author is categorical in his estimation of the events described and their
influence on the development of political situation in Belarus. Nonetheless, the book is of great
interest to experts in the sphere of youth movement (sociologists, pedagogues, psychologists,
historians), because it gives a detailed idea of the history of the formation and activities of one of the
most influential youth organizations in Belarus – Malady Front. In this respect the book is unique.
Also it could be of great interest to young adults having no definite social position yet.
Irina Burina, IISEPS expert
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Appendix
REGULATION OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE REPUBLIC OF BELARUS
1174 of August 29, 2002.
on activity related to conducting researches and publishing results of public opinion polls
concerning the public-political situation in the country, national referenda and elections
In order to regulate conducting researches and publishing results of public opinion polls related to
the public-political situation in the country, national referenda and elections, the Council of Ministers
of the Republic of Belarus decrees:
1. to establish that conducting researches and publishing results of public opinion polls related to
national referenda, elections of the President of the Republic of Belarus, deputies of the National
Assembly of the Republic of Belarus and the public-political situation in the country is to be carried
out by legal entities accredited with the Opinion Poll Commission at the National Academy of
Sciences.
2. to appoint Doctor of Sociological Studies, Professor Igor Kotlyarov the head of the Opinion Poll
Commission at the National Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Belarus.
3. the Opinion Poll Commission at the National Academy of Sciences shall within a three-month
period determine conditions and procedure for accreditation (recognition of powers) of legal entities
claiming to conduct activities related to the regulation of carrying out researches and publishing
results of public opinion polls concerning national referenda, elections of the President of the
Republic of Belarus, deputies of the National Assembly of the Republic of Belarus and the public-
political situation in the country.
Prime Minister of the Republic of Belarus
CONFIRMED
Regulation of the
Council of Ministers of the
Republic of Belarus
707 of May 31, 2002
REGULATION
n the Opinion Poll Commission
at the National Academy of Sciences
(extractions)
4. An association carrying public opinion poll on social and political situation in the country, on
referenda or election in the country is to send to the Commission a written notice and commitment to
observe during polling the legislation and the procedure of sociological studies, of processing and
analysis of the sociological information. The commitment should also contain information about the
association carrying the opinion poll and its client, sources of financing the opinion poll, time and
conditions of its carrying out. Information requirements are determined by the Commission.
5. If the opinion poll data is published, the association that carried the opinion poll is to present
additional information into the Commission on the polling subject, methods of information gathering,
criteria of respondents selection, full list of the posed questions with the number of the respondents
on each not answered question, copies of the information quality assurance protocols if quality as-
surance was carried and also published poll based material.
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